When I picked up Chalmers Johnson’s Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire what I was expecting was an elaboration of the term ‘blowback’ and some examples of the negative consequences of US military operations. What I got was much more. The book shines when it dies into financial machinations centered in the East Asian pacific region, blending gruesome stories of what goes on in US military bases with complex currency manipulations designed to keep those countries from growing too strong economically. Written before the events of September 11th, 2001 and the subsequent war on terror the book lets us see the workings of US imperialism from a less spectacular era. The Cold War having been won and US global dominance assured, the full power of dollar diplomacy and economic intervention is brought to the fore.Continue reading “Blowback: The 1997 East Asian Financial Crisis”
What the Whiskey Rebellion Can Teach Us About Using Cannabis Money for Public BankingContinue reading “Public Banking and Taxing the Wild Frontier”
As the twenty-first century drags on, we face an uncertain road ahead. To catch a glimpse of hope we need not look that far back into history to find working models for both prosperity and sustainability. It has been encouraging to see activists working hard on forming public banks, for these banks can change the fortunes of every member of the economy in a time of vast wealth inequality. The times call for practical-minded solutions to big problems like climate change and economic stagnation. To seize the moment, we need only look to our own past for models that work.
Out west, cannabis is one of the biggest economic drivers of the region. Its coming into the fold of taxation and regulation at the state level offers a turning point that could lift up far more than just the people involved in the industry. By chartering a public bank in California, the cannabis industry can use banking services where once they could only use cash. It solves the problem of paying taxes in large suitcases full of dollar bills and a lack of small business loans for cannabis businesses with less start up capital. But the really exciting part comes with what the state can do with its own bank once that revenue is drawn in from pot funds. Financing large scale infrastructure projects that can transition the economy from one based on fossil-fuels and freeways into a renewable economy with clean energy all but requires that we utilize public banks. Nothing else can bring all of the funds together for such a massive undertaking that so many people believe must be done.
The pioneers of cannabis farming sought to escape from a society that suffocated their creativity and freedom of expression. They were so successful that others followed them out there in a curiously similar movement to other historical movements that brought people out west in droves. The California Green Rush, like the Gold Rush and the Timber Boom before it, brought billions of dollars to the further reaches of the American west in a hurried and chaotic fashion. It is likely that the Back-to-the-Land cannabis farmer will be mythologized in a similar way that the gold panning pioneer was in the nineteenth century. With the Redwood Curtain lifted and profits soaring, rugged individuals and hippy communes are sure to get the romanticized treatment of yet another distinct culture subsumed by modern business. Public banking offers a way out of this predicament. With its public financing model, we no longer have to play the game rigged by Wall St to benefit the already well-off. Hippies get to put a dent into the capitalist machine after all – just not the way they expected 50 years ago.
Small farmers and landed peasants have always born the brunt of specialized industry marching forward. It’s a fact that has torn apart people’s relationship with the earth for over 200 years now. It has also created enormous prosperity, especially at the national level. Innovations in banking, worker specialization, and increased scales of production set off irreversible processes into motion that need to be reckoned with democratically instead of with a blanket rejection. Alexander Hamilton’s vision won out but the implementation has gone way off course. If we hearken back to the eighteenth century, we can see a virtuous project too far ahead of its time to be appreciated in the Bank of the United States. The man wasn’t perfect (in fact, he was down-right elitist), but Hamilton did have the common good in mind when he conceived a national public bank in his mind and willed it into existence. With a quick crash course in public banking, one can grasp just how necessary establishing new banks are to creating an economy in which everyone wins.
Currently, cities and states must borrow money from Wall St banks to finance their projects. The payments made to municipal and state bondholders, plus interest payments made to banks from loans doubles the cost of any large project. Public worker’s hours and pensions are being slashed, facilities are downsizing and getting privatized, and the investor class is making off with the profits like bandits. Money that could be circulating within the public sector and distributed equitably is drying up. Fringe finance is replacing banks that no longer deem it profitable to do business with the poor, extracting wealth for basic services that could be done easily by the post office. The money pie is shrinking because access to credit has been consolidated by extraordinarily wealthy financiers in their private bank accounts and tax shelters. Public finance is the key to unlocking the economic potential just waiting to be let loose. [What We Could Do with a Postal Savings Bank: Infrastructure that Doesn’t Cost Tax Payers a Dime]
Public banking has a proven track record. Everywhere you look, from Germany to China to early America, linking governments to the technologies of banks is a proven winner. It is not only profitable for governments but the private individuals involved in financing and borrowing from it. The only ones who lose are the already ultra-rich 1%, the ones who want to keep their monopoly on the lending/money-creation powers of banks. With the sudden availability of funds opened up by the cannabis industry’s wave of legalization, the time is now to turn high profits into big ideas for a sustainable future. [Dave Dayen: The Ultimate Cash Crop: How a Pot Crisis Restarted a Public Banking Conversation in America]
In the period following the ratification of the federal US Constitution, the financial course for the new nation had yet to be charted. Alexander Hamilton had a dream to turn the former colonies into a modern mercantilist nation on a model he borrowed from the British and its Bank of England. His idea would succeed with flying colors, but few truly understood just what he had done to make banking so indispensable to the health of this new form of economics. It would take decades for the nation to warm up to the idea of banks as an everyday feature of American life, but by that time, private banks would dominate the landscape and the old civic-minded banks would be a distant memory.
People were highly suspicious of the purity of Hamilton and other speculator’s motives, and rightfully so. Populist anger the elite eastern “stockjobbers” was well-founded, the blanket rejection of banks and all financial schemes was, however, foolish. Banking (especially of the public variety) would prove to be so successful that its detractors would come around in the long run, but the damage would already be done by that time. The option for government involvement in banking was besieged and destroyed in the first decades of the United States, that is, until the populist farmers realized that bringing banking into the government was the best and perhaps only defense against the insatiable greed of Wall Street bankers and industrialists in the antebellum nineteenth century. In hindsight, keeping public banks around was the best way to prevent gross economic hardship, but the battle-lines were drawn differently in these very different times.
The revolts and minor uprisings that occurred in this time period were all debt related. Traditional debt relations were far more fluid and amenable to the needs of common villagers before modern economics took a hold of them. The soldiers and suppliers of the Revolutionary War had not been paid. Their expedients for trade were dashed. Their protests were quelled. Before 1787, farmers outside of the merchant city regions had the benefit of the state’s former issuance of paper money to stimulate business. They began as a war-time expedient during the seven-years-war but remained afterward to everyone’s joy. In a frontier land lacking in specie (metal coin currency), paper money was a godsend. But the new constitution forbade the states from issuing any more colonial scrip and centralized the money-making function within the new federal government. The very first articles of the US Constitution are explicitly designed to prevent states from issuing their own ‘bills of credit’ and instead enshrine the return of the economy to a hard currency basis. The framers worried about the inflation these bills created, but paper money would come to dominate the economy anyways in the form of bank notes.
If bills of credit or paper money could no longer be used by farmers, then they were stuck with hard specie scarcity. Their business was less connected to the world at large, so metal money was harder to get their hands on.On top of that, exploitation by speculators, who sensed their desperation only to capitalize on it, added to their affective loathing of all things financial coming from the coastal port cities. Upon reading accounts of the financial hardships of American farmers and poor debtors, laid out in the previous post, it’s easy to see why they would be driven to such hate. But every actor needs a circulating medium of exchange to lift their fortunes. The distrust of a banker-government partnership inculcated during this period of history went a long way towards eliminating the necessary checks against the money-creating power of private banks. The banks role in controlling the increase or decrease in the overall supply of money could only be effectively curtailed and controlled by a central governing body endowed with financial powers like that of a bank. Distrust and anger at central government and public banks actually hurt prospects for economic justice by empowering private banks to carry on this highly profitable enterprise free of restraint.
Bray Hammond sticks the point well at the beginning of his grand history of banks in Banks and Politics in America: From the Revolution to the Civil War:
“The agrarian demand for paper money and easy credit which did at last appear in the States in the latter part of the 19th century arose from tardy recognition by the agrarians that they lived in a modern economy, not in dreamland, and in order to hold their own must use credit as business men did. It arose from a slow realization that farming must be a means of making money, not of withholding oneself from the world… But in the face of business enterprise and industrialization, it became impossible for farming to remain unchanged. Stock had to be improved. Machinery had to be acquired. The elements of farm capital became diversified, the land itself ceasing to be the one ingredient of weight. Money and credit forced their way into the farmer’s reckoning.” (Hammond, p.33)
It’s at this point that a shift in emphasis must ensue. A different country than the one Jefferson envisioned was taking shape around the turn of the 18th to the 19th century and we cannot simply remain pitted against all financial concoctions wherever they crop up. The future involves banks and they need to be made to work for the people or the vast majority instead of fought at every turn. The makings of a modern economy were shaping up at this time; increased specialization in the workplace and the overriding importance of overseas trade in the international game of political economy was drowning out the small farmer’s hope for New World of freeholders. The cat was out of the bag.
The scars leftover from Federalist era lingered on into the Jacksonian era of Democratic entrepreneurialism until the producing farmers figured out how debt, monetary policy, and banks effected them on the national level many decades later. The populist party sought to take over control of the money supply away from banks in the late eighteenth century with their ‘sub-treasury’ system and the non-partisan league would successfully lobby for a state-owned bank in North Dakota. But no movement in America has been able to sustain a public-oriented financial school of thought in the tumultuous times that capitalist industrialism wrought at the end of the 19th century, 20th and up until today. We have a moment right now to establish new public banks with the growing momentum of the public banking movement. It is high time that certain truths about banking become a part of common wisdom and used for the benefit of the 99% instead of the exclusive gain of the 1%.
Hamilton’s Bank of the United States was lauded by all those who understood it. It not only flipped a liability in high war debts into an asset (quite literally), it spread new money out into the economy whenever loans were dispersed. It’s bank notes functioned just like money, similar to the paper money of colonial scrip but more like state bank notes also circulating, so it increased the amount of business that could be done in two separate ways simultaneously. It offered credit for new projects in a typical lending fashion and then, as a result, bank notes could be drawn on representing the promise to repay the debt. These notes were basically paper IOU’s for the original loan/deposited coin (more on this later), but they would inevitably change hands many times in the course of business and effectively enter circulation as money. This is the what makes banks so hotly contested: they don’t just offer loans and act as special intermediaries for future business (though they do that also), they increase the amount of money in the system as a whole so long as they remain solvent (i.e. have enough hard currency to back up the notes that come back in for redemption, or withstand the depletion of specie from their vaults). That these bank notes could be used to pay federal taxes enhanced their acceptability as legitimate money.
Absent regulation, this operation is fragile and private banks are incentivized to extend credit wherever they can profit. The increase in available paper bank notes/IOU’s increases the amount of money passing from hand-to-hand in the general economy, even if you as an individual do not have an account at that bank or any bank. Those paper bank notes can always be redeemed at a local branch of the corresponding bank for hard coin in the vaults, that is, unless too many notes come in for redemption at once and the vaults are depleted.Provided the bank remains solvent, the net effect on the economy at large is immense. Having more things getting passed around as money lifts up the general economic prospects of every actor in the system, provided that the amount of notes issued are commensurate with the overall level of real economic activity. Issue too many and you get price inflation, too little and prices drop but there is less money around to get your hands on.
The national public bank of Hamilton was able to check the excessive issuance of bank notes in the way that a central bank does now. Today central banks are independent of government and merely transfer money from one bank within its system to another in the form of reserves in their central bank accounts. The first and second Bank of the United States operated slightly differently but also kept private banks and state banks that existed before them from collapsing in a heap of panic, rendering its notes useless and its contribution to the overall money supply vanishing in a flash. It made sure that the ratio of bank notes to reserves didn’t get too high and private banks couldn’t print way more notes than they could back up with coins. The first Bank of the United States, Hamilton’s bank, operated in a time when the split between public and private sectors was not so pronounced. Many believed that private investors were needed to lend credibility to the institution in the first place, the government being too young and fragile to instill any confidence. But it was a public bank that served the needs of the people at large by servicing the new and fragile government’s debt and hence its credibility as a future borrower. It increased the supply of money to stimulate industry by issuing its own US Bank Notes that had a wide circulation.
Banks whether public or private wield enormous power by controlling the size of money in the economy at any given time. This is not always well-understood by economists but when banks make loans they increase the amount of money flowing through the economy. Bank loans create more money, paying back those debts created by the loan destroys it. It’s an extraordinary tool within a modern economy and there is no reason why governments shouldn’t be involved in banking when it plays such a vital (and lucrative) role. This is what Hamilton’s bank did before private businessmen and entrepreneurs started opening up their own banks and attacking the national bank. In another one of histories ironies, it was farmer’s opposition to the Hamilton’s policies that killed the second Bank of the United States when Andrew Jackson swept into power. Little did they know that this national, central bank was the only thing preventing private banks from wildly profiting off of the economy’s need for credit, in turn playing havoc on the money supply. The full story is told in Bray Hammond’s standard financial history book in Banks and Politics in America from the Revolution to the Civil War.
According to Hammond, Hamilton did understand this crucial function of banking. It’s quite possible that only a handful of individuals grasped this operation and its significance and few understand it still today. The fact that banks create money, control its supply (in a more-or-less/marginal sort way of increases or decreases from day to day instead of absolutely), and perform a systemically vital function to a dynamic modern economy escapes contemporary economic textbook definitions of banks as mere “intermediaries.” If we replace the terms of 21st century economics with ones from the 18th century, we can still detail the same banking function:
“…[I]n the sentence before his explanation of specie deposits, Hamilton had made the observation that every loan which a bank makes is in the first instance a credit on its books in favor of the borrower and that, unless withdrawn in specie, it remains a liability of the bank till the loan is repaid. In these words he explained 20th century banking as will as 18th, and how bank lending creates bank deposits, with the difference that he did not call them “deposits” but reserved that term for specie transactions, distinguishing credit for specie from credit for the proceeds of loans. He did so because he observed banking in terms of the individual bank and not of many banks constituting a system. He was writing at a time when there were three banks only in America, each sole in its community. The effect each bank’s lending had on its own positions was in those circumstances direct and unobscured; its loans obviously increased what would now be called its deposits; for the checks drawn on it were not being deposited in other banks nor were the checks drawn on others being deposited in it. Each bank was a closed and separate system. Hamilton simply noted what in the then situation was plain and required no unusual discernment. The records of the Massachusetts Bank indicate how common it was at the very beginning to credit borrower’s accounts with the amounts lent them; and the known figures of deposit liabilities are plainly too large to have arisen from specie alone. Such credits seem in practice to have been included with deposits proper but in discussion to have been kept distinct. A deposit was of something tangible, whether for safekeeping or to apply on a capital subscription. The liability for amounts lent was called credit or book credit, as by Hamilton in the passage in which he described the procedure.
Though exempting specie deposits from the restriction could scarcely have given a bank any more inducement than it already had to acquire specie; it doubtless seemed logical to Hamilton that the liability arising from deposits of specie be distinguished from the liability representing the proceeds of loans and that it be excepted from limitations on an expansion that could occur only when liabilities were assumed in excess of the specie held. The issuance of notes and the crediting of customers’ accounts might and did entail the assumption of liabilities in excess of specie holdings, but not when the issuance of the credit resulted from a deposit of specie.” (Hammond, p.138-9. Emphasis mine.)
In other words, when a loan is made by a bank it doesn’t matter that there isn’t enough corresponding metal coin specie to match it one-for-one. Taking in deposits or specie to store in its vaults and making loans to those seeking credit are two separate functions of banking that work in tandem but don’t require a steadfast equivalence. When a loan is made, the amount of money requested by the borrower is written into their account, which they can then draw on regardless of how much specie that individual has deposited on their own. The only thing that matters is that people don’t rush in and grab all of the hard currency all at once in a panic. As long as the bank is believed to be trustworthy, it is. The bank can then keep on lending as much as it likes (more or less), printing more of its bank notes (no doubt to change hands many times), and profiting off of the regular interest payments coming in from the borrower. It’s this ambiguity that leads people to call banking a monster of instability playing fast and loose with our money. Within the accounting format called ‘double-entry bookkeeping’ is the ability to measurably increase the overall money supply by entering numbers on a piece of paper during the loan making process. Whether those two sides read ‘asset/liability,’ ‘credit/deposits,’ or ‘bank credit/specie capital’ is insignificant. It’s in the proportion of one to the other that the fluctuations in money supply increase or decrease, but the ratio itself was fluid in the early days of banking.
“The practice then was less conventional than now, for then, taking advantage of the fact that every item on a bank’s books has both an asset and a liability aspect, it might be called either; whereas now every item belongs rigidly on one side or the other. Thus deposits were sometimes what a bank held and sometimes what it owed; and circulation represented money lent as much as money owed. There is a modern parallel in the fact that bank credit may be measured either in assets or in liabilities, and though the statistical practice of measuring it in loans and investments is now well established, deposits are often taken informally as its measure, and the law provides for its control through the ration of reserves to deposit liabilities.” (Hammond, p. 141)
Banking reform would later come in the form of reserve ratios to restrict the amount of loans on one side of the page to the reserves on the other side. Playing with this ratio became the way to check bank’s influence on the economy at large and prevent collapse of banks who greedily issued to many notes without having enough coin to back them up. But fixing reserve ratios as a universal standard did not and does not provide an effective restraint upon the banking system in general. This method assumes, falsely, that issuance of loans comes attached to the specie in the vault when they are actually two separate functions within a bank. The ratio can go up or down and still be left in tact. What matters is that the confidence trick in the bank’s vaults is upheld and people don’t collectively make a run on the bank. As Hammond explains above, it doesn’t really matter if you focus in on the amount of deposits at the bank or the amount of book credit granted by a loan. They are two separate things that have been joined together within the marble walls and pillars of the bank so that a single thing (money) can be multiplied and dispersed where businesses wants it to go.
The Bank of the United States performed this function in a controlled, centralized manner that serviced a fledgling nation. It’s not so absurd to say that without it, the United States might have crumbled in its infancy under the surrounding colonial European powers and its own war debts. Hamilton’s Bank serviced the interest on the debt, enhanced the credibility of the United States of America abroad, stimulated business, and acted as an early-modern regulator of the banking system.
“its prominence as one of the largest corporations in America and its branches’ broad geographic position in the emerging American economy allowed it to conduct a rudimentary monetary policy. The bank’s notes, backed by substantial gold reserves, gave the country a relatively stable national currency. By managing its lending policies and the flow of funds through its accounts, the bank could — and did — alter the supply of money and credit in the economy and hence the level of interest rates charged to borrowers.
These actions, which had effects similar to today’s monetary policy, can be seen most clearly in the Bank’s interactions with state banks. In the course of business, the Bank would accumulate the notes of the state banks and hold them in its vault. When it wanted to slow the growth of money and credit, it would present the notes to banks for collection in gold or silver, thereby reducing state banks’ reserves and putting the brakes on their ability to circulate new banknotes. To speed up the growth of money and credit, the Bank would hold on to the state banks’ notes, thereby increasing state banks’ reserves and allowing those banks to issue more banknotes by making loans.
The Bank’s branches were all located in the fledgling nation’s port cities. This made it easier for the federal government to collect tax revenues, most of which came from customs duties. Locating the branches in ports also made it easier for the Bank to finance international trade and help the Treasury fund the government’s operations through sales of US government securities to foreigners. Furthermore, the Bank’s branch system gave it another advantage: it could move its notes around the country more readily than could a state bank. The Bank’s branches also helped to fund and encourage the country’s westward expansion, particularly with the establishment of a branch in New Orleans.” [Federal Reserve History Website]
So the utility of this bank is without question. More than a money-making machine for a handful of investors getting fat off collecting interest payments, it actually prevented the excesses of banks from spiraling out of control and wrecking the greater economy – as would happen many times after the two banks were killed. In its virtuous civic function, The Bank of the United States was almost an “anti-bank bank” that looked after all actors within the bounds of the nation instead of a small faction of wealthy investors. The number of those kinds of banks would multiply very soon and the network of private banks would come to dominate the American economy to this day. Had the Bank survived, industry would have progressed much more steadily and without the chaos of epidemic bank failures, greatly reducing the severity of depressions that jaded so many Americans. One can imagine the despair and resentment of a population left holding worthless pieces of paper that used to be as good as money, failing to understand what exactly had gone wrong.
It’s worth looking at how this bank was incorporated, if only to admire the grandeur of an intelligent plan conceived on paper but willed into reality. With the war debts exceeding $150 million from the federal and state treasuries combined, interest payments would need to be effected soon. Direct payment with taxes would have crippled an economy that didn’t have as much specie available to do business as is, with outlying farmers feeling this pain exceptionally. The bank would offer to the public a subscription for future stock of the bank to the limit of $8 million, with the federal treasury owning $2 million for a total of $10 million. The federal government would own one-fifth of the bank and private citizens would make up the remaining four-fifths, drawing interest from the scrips they bought. Once enough specie was collected (which it was almost immediately), the game was in play and debt servicing could commence on the basis of that hard currency.
“Though the authorized capital of the Bank was $10,000,000, of which $2,000,000 was to be paid in specie, the Bank was permitted to organize as soon as $400,000 had been received from the subscribers. Whether much more was ever got from them on successive installments is doubtful, though the Bank subsequently accumulated a treasure much in excess of what the stockholders were supposed to pay. Payment for the government’s stock was accomplished under an authorizations in the charter that was taken over almost intact form Hamilton’s proposal and was presumably intended by him to give the appearance of a cash payment. In effect the Treasury drew for $2,000,000 on the United States commissioners engaged in selling government securities in Amsterdam, deposited the drafts with the Bank, and then drew against the deposit to pay for the stock. Technically this consummated the purchase of the stock with funds borrowed in Europe. But it was not desired to have the drafts go through and the specie shipped from Europe, because it would have had to be shipped back for other purposes. So the Treasury borrowed $2,000,000 from the Bank and used the amount to take up the drafts on the commissioners, with which the whole transaction had opened. The net effect was therefore to leave the government in possession of $2,000,000 of Bank stock and in debt to the Bank for $2,000,000, though technically the money owing to the Bank had not been used to buy the stock but to “restore” the funds in Amsterdam which had been “used” for that purpose.” (Hammond, p.123-4)
It was a kind of trick that can work with the use of a public bank and the stability of a government combined. Only enough specie needed to be acquired so that those who needed it could draw on it when they needed it. The rest of the subscribers, including the treasury, kept their accounts on the books and waited for the interest payments to come in from regular installments. The one-fifth of the bank that the government owned it didn’t actually pay for, it borrowed the money from Dutch financiers already keen on these machinations. Instead of physically transferring specie hand-to-hand, agents of the treasury gave to the Dutch paper promises to pay later. They then used this borrowed money to buy bank stock (which earns interest) and pay off the imbalances of the account as time goes on. It all works because there is enough specie to be drawn out of the bank on occasion, allowing the pretense of convertibility between metal money and paper money to persist. People trusted that there would be enough business in America for these accounts to be settled in the end because there was so much nascent potential on the American continent, the bank allowed them to push paying off debts forward into the future by playing with this divergence in forms of money. Essentially, it was a leap of faith on everyone’s part:
“The early Americans were short of capital, particularly capital in the form of gold and silver. If that dearth of gold and silver had been allowed to hold up their formation of banks, the circle would never have been broken; instead they resorted to arrangements which had the practical virtue of establishing the proper procedure in principle if not in fact. And in time, because the pretenses worked, they accumulated the gold and silver and made the principle a reality. It is a case where a pious lifting of oneself by the bootstraps is preferable to cynical realism or conscientious passivity. And for the most part a saner and more honest practice in capitalization established itself as soon as a surplus of wealth made it possible. Without the initial act of faith, so to speak, the surplus would have been slower in coming. The Americans had declared their political independence before it was a reality, not after; and what they did in the matter of financial competence was much the same.” (Hammond, p.124)
It’s the complexity of the move, the juggling of many different obligations all at once, that makes people resort to religious terminology to explain what in the world just happened before their eyes. But all parties simply had enough trust in the ability for a national government to persist in a stabilized capacity, collect enough taxes, pay investors their installments of interest, and receive the required initial subscription to kick things off. Hamilton was also an eloquent speaker and assured congress that his plan would work. He was right and he knew it.
The Bank of the United States brought together private business and public regulation together at a time when both needed each others help. The bank and public banks like it expanded the total money supply in a controlled and regulated fashion, while giving the government the means to pay off its own debts. When the treasury was forced to liquidate its bank stock, it profited for “$672,000 or 30 per cent, and the dividends it received while shareholder were $1,100,000.” (Hammond, p.207) Public banks are very profitable for the governments they represent, but they partner with the other banks and keep them from stashing these profits all to themselves. If large projects are to be effected without a public bank to borrow from, private banks pocket the interest from that demand for funds. Since banks create money, owning one means you can essentially borrow from yourself, like the confidence trick of the Bank of the United States.
The expediency of the bank can be mimicked in our own day and at the state level. Having a public bank for each state would stabilize the rest of the banks of that state by providing additional money to borrow at lower interests. Interests rates could be lowered across the board, or raised if too much business activity is causing inflation and over-extension of credit; and there lies the great hope: a regulated banking industry unbeholden to the insatiable demands of unchecked private banks. This is not a faux-public central bank like the federal reserve, but one that really works for the people by relieving the strangle hold that private banks have on the creation of money. Governments don’t have to be debtors begging for money to start their projects, slashing public worker hours and benefits, stagnating wages, and paying huge amounts of interest to private bankers when they own their own bank.
Legalization Is Pushing Small Cannabis Farmers Out, So Lets Make the Pot Profits Work for Everyone
A large chunk of hippy counterculture took a turn toward a rural agrarian lifestyle in the 1970’s in a movement called ‘back-to-the-land’ and subsequently discovered a path to riches. Marijuana is illegal under federal law so smoking it became a mark of the renegade subculture — growing and selling it even more so. Growing cannabis was a way for the people of this movement who sought to reconnect with nature and disconnect from mainstream American society to support themselves. What began as a practice for supplementing an alternative lifestyle up in the secluded mountains of northern California blossomed into one of the most lucrative industries on the west coast today, with much of the cannabis heading east to find markets in the rest of the country. Within a single generation, the hippy subculture turned from gleefully impoverished idealists seeking self-sustenance to rich independent farmers when the full financial potential of this crop was inevitably realized.
Money was never the objective when hippies started cultivating cannabis in the mountains, but by the time President Reagan declared a war on drugs small-time farmers were making millions. It was a curious transformation riddled with irony: a people trying to escape individualistic materialism and found a communal ethic out in the woods suddenly found an easy path to riches. Just how much money changed the culture is debatable. What is undeniable though is that the marijuana that was grown in Northern California found its way into a vast unregulated market worth billions of dollars. It would only take a few decades for politicians to start eye-balling that black market money, especially with the negative perceptions of smoking marijuana cooling off nationwide.
As of January 1st, 2018, the law approved by a simple majority of all Californian voters are in effect, attempting to bring cannabis cultivators back into the fold of the taxable California State economy. No longer will the industry operate in a strictly core-periphery dynamic: the secluded hills and favorable climate where cannabis is grown are now heavily targeted by entrepreneurs. The old-school cannabis farmer lived in a community that developed a sense of freedom and independence while simultaneously feeling besieged by the federal government. Paranoia was a shared sentiment that reinforced defiant hippy beliefs about authoritative American culture and produced an ethic of mutual aid. High profits, a protected geography dubbed the “Redwood Curtain,” and a healthy degree of solidarity among cannabis farmers allowed for a mutated form of hippy counterculture to persist. But once the word got out around the mid-nineties more people started flowing into Humboldt, Mendocino and surrounding counties in what became known as the “Green Rush” (because cannabis is the new gold). The profit margin was just too darn high to keep people from jumping on the bandwagon that hippies inadvertently created and sustained.
It’s a story that has been told before and people started to notice the continuity of the back-to-the-land hippies with the American culture they initially broke off from. This perceived connection brought local author Ray Raphael into the study of the revolutionary America with his popular history books. [Ray Raphael] Having written books on nature, northern Californian geography and marijuana farmers in Cash Crop: An American Dream, he then went on to become a decorated heterodox historian of the revolutionary period with an eye towards everyday people and their struggles. Near the end of Cash Crop, Raphael writes, “As a rags-to-riches story, the marijuana boom goes straight to the heart of American mythology.”
“A heightened sense of individualism — that definitive ideal of Americanism, the theoretical hub of our social philosophy — is central to the ideology of marijuana growers. The flamboyant and free-spirited “do-your-own-thing” of the original back-to-the-land movement has evolved quite effortlessly into more traditional manifestations of American individualism: an obsession with private property and a conservative reaction against governmental intrusions into private affairs.” (p.160)
It’s as if hippies tried to escape America in their communes only to find more America. Instead of a utopia of liberation they found the Jeffersonian ideal of the yeoman farmer, an independent and self-sustaining landowner in a vibrant community. After the communes disintegrated, the spirit of communitarian values persisted and even thrived thanks to influx of bags full of greenback dollars. But were the new riches creating greater resiliency or altering the culture to one of materialistic wealth accumulation?
“From a democratic point of view, perhaps the biggest failure of the traditional capitalist system is its tendency for consolidation. Small businesses continually go under, either driven out or swallowed up by their larger competition. Even in agriculture, the family farm is no longer a viable unit; high-tech agribusiness drives prices down to where small, labor-intensive farmers can no longer compete. Apparently, consolidation is an inevitable feature of capitalism — except in the case of marijuana farming. In the marijuana industry there are structural forces which counteract the natural tendency toward centralization. The combination of illegality and geographic isolation provide built-in guarantees against consolidation. The larger the operation, the higher the risk — so there’s a strong incentive to stay small and decentralized.” (p.171)
With the protective barrier to consolidation and bigness gone, replaced by legal farms able to withstand the very high start-up costs, the pioneers of cannabis farmers face an uncertain future. The high taxes, lawyer and filing fees, new labeling requirements, and more have prevented most farmers from becoming legal compliant. As of March 2018, over 99% of cannabis farmers have not gotten through the onerous licensing process. [Report: 99% of Cannabis Growers Are Still Unlicensed] Especially onerous is the excise tax — just like Alexander Hamilton leveled on the whiskey distillers. The cannabis excise tax comes in at a whopping 15%, with multiple sales taxes accompanying it along the supply chain until retail. This has caused the price of legal cannabis to jump about 50% at the same time as the price of illegal cannabis sold on the street plummets. So many people began growing this plant during the green rush that it resulted in a glut in the market supply, without adequate means for those new farmers to go legal. After prop 64 took effect, people who once could live off of their marijuana crop now find themselves in dire straights.
At the time of writing this piece, politicians are signaling that they will attempt to lower the excise tax in a bid to draw more cannabis farmers into the fold. [California considers cut in marijuana taxes in bid to lure legal users] Such would be an act of mercy and justice for the pioneers of an industry that will net the state billions in additional tax revenue. In a contentious hearing at the board of supervisors meeting in Humboldt country (ground zero for early cannabis farming), citizens poured into the halls to plead for lower taxes and the end of corporate loopholes that favor the wealthy. [Frustration and Fear: Local Cannabis Farmers Ask for Help, Claim Measure S Could Put Them Out of Business and Deprive County of Their Tax Revenue] It’s still unclear whether the barriers to entry will remain so high, but people are pushing back and want to be a part of the legal economy. The demand is now for an easier way to join the state regulated economy rather than escape it. The pot growing community has come a long way since the idealistic days of nonconformity.
The desire for access into the regulated market is mainly to prevent the consolidation of industry that Ray Raphael wrote about in Cash Crop. People had always known that legalization would encourage big agribusiness to move into their backyard; without proper permits, law enforcement would end up taking down the smaller business instead of targeting the large ones like it did in the past. Legalization mixed with high taxes has meant that the scale of cannabis farms is getting bigger, a reversal of the tacit agreement between the community and federal drug enforcement that kept operations small. It is the fear of monopoly capitalism that supersedes fear of big government for the people out west — it is the Left Coast after all. The only game left in town is tweaking the rulers so that the law promotes a decentralized industry instead of one dominated by a few players. If we believe with Raphael that capitalism inevitably consolidates into monopoly power, then fair laws that protect small farmers are the only check cannabis farmers have left.
With the law kept as is, small farmers will likely be phased out of the market. Bigger farms tend to yield more product with fewer costs in what economists call “economies of scale” or, in other words, capitalist consolidation. Perhaps the back-to-the-landers are facing a reckoning for failing to curtail gangs from extracting as much black market profits from the region or for looking the other way when signs of environmental damage were all too apparent. [Outlaw Weed Comes into the Light] But there are forces at play that dwarf the collective power of this little haven that hippies found in Northern California. The next step for counterculture on the west coast will be to engage with those greater forces and follow the money instead of stash it.
If cannabis farmers (whoever ends up with the legal profits in the industry) could pool their money together into a bank that the entire state of California has access to as deposits for loans, a great victory would be achieved. A public bank would be the saving grace of the hippies and cement their legacy as a true force against American mainstream capitalism. This would complete the journey of the back-to-the-landers after their escape from American culture. They could take their place alongside the populist farmer movements like the NonPartisan League that willed the Bank of North Dakota into existence. [How the Nation’s Only State-Owned Bank Became the Envy of Wall Street]
The best part is, one doesn’t even have to be a cannabis farmer nor ever have been in the cannabis industry. All we have to do is educate people on the benefits of public banking and for those people to lobby California politicians. [Public Banking Institute] The crucial factor on this issue is linking cannabis profits with accessible deposits for the rest of California. [A Public Bank for Pot Entrepreneurs? How About the Rest of Us?] Such would be practical way to bring economic justice to everyone in the state (and galvanize a nationwide movement) instead of just those under the majestic Redwoods.
What the Whiskey Rebellion Can Teach Us About Using Cannabis Money for Public Banking
Something big is stirring out west. Since the California voters passed Proposition 64, cannabis use and cultivation has been made legal for all adults over 21 years old and the consequences of this law are far reaching. When we contrast the history of cannabis cultivation with the new practices resulting from Prop 64, a story emerges that is at once new and old. What is new is a centralized, regulated, and taxed cannabis industry replacing the decentralized small farmers of the past, what is old is a story of taming frontier economies with high taxation. It’s a story that is liable to provoke romantic sentiments for the plight of the small-time farmer in the face of unstoppable capitalist progress but we can do better. With the right degree of activist lobbying the cannabis industry can lead the charge in demanding a California state public bank – a bank that would solidify the populist legacy of the outlaw pioneer cannabis farmer.
Something similar was accomplished in the first years of the republic. During the so-called ‘Whiskey Rebellion’ (a term invented to discredit the uprising) farmers on what was then the wild frontier formed militias to resist the new taxation policy of Alexander Hamilton. These rowdy ‘regulators’ protested against a financier-oriented tax plan that was onerous and unfair even though it ended up financing a beneficial new institution. Their anger was justified: western farmers had been targeted by the wealthy easterners before and now further economic burden would befall them where they could afford it the least. Protesting in those days had a different meaning than it does today. We haven’t seen someone tarred-and-feathered in centuries, nor have we seen spontaneous armed uprisings in quite some time. Instead, we should look at what all of this tax revenue generated by the whiskey tax was used for and what all of this money generated by the Cannabis industry could be used for now.
Despite the absence of tax-resisting militia-men today, the similarities between the changes taking place within the cannabis industry and the Pennsylvania regulation of 1794 are striking, especially when we look into the realm of banking. Although the new cannabis tax revenue for California can’t go towards funding a public bank (the funds generated by prop 64 will go into a special fund predesignating where the money will go), the cannabis industry needs a place to safely store its profits and a public bank is the only kind of bank that can fit the bill. Marijuana is still a schedule one illegal substance at the federal level (amazingly, given its proven medicinal properties), so businesses operating in cannabis do not have access to nationally chartered banks under FDIC requirements. A huge industry generating many billions of dollars is forced to operate with duffle bags full of cash. A state owned and operated bank, on the other hand, bypasses this oddity and creates a win-win for both Californians and the cannabis industry.
Public banks have an enormous benefit for the economy within which they operate. Hamilton conceived the first Bank of the United States and the means to fund it entirely on his own. It helped stabilize the finances of the nation in its infancy after it had accumulated massive war debts both foreign and domestic. By a stroke of genius, those debts were parlayed into a system that convinced investors to do business with the unproven new nation and continue to allow the government to borrow on favorable terms. War debts became the basis of the new economy under this program of ‘Assumption’ and bondholders would continue to hold confidence in doing business with the American government. The only problem was the start-up costs came from poor frontier farmers already beset by economic suppression. It was a giant slap in the face to the people who had fought for liberty and independence, but the bank that financed it stabilized a nascent country in precarious circumstances. Today we have much more willing tax base, in spite of the many resentful cannabis farmers getting edged out by the high cost of going legit, and with the help of persistent public banking advocates a Public Bank of California that benefits the entire state is within reach.
The differences between these two events separated by over 200 years are numerous but three important elements bring them together: a profitable yet unregulated agrarian economy suddenly besieged by taxes, a maligned commodity that is much more than what it seems, and the establishment of a public bank (potentially this time). Like the cannabis farmer on the west coast, the whiskey distiller on the frontier lands of western Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Kentucky and elsewhere used distilled spirits as a cost-effective means for earning an income. Whiskey was downed by almost everyone in America and the frontier people could sell it to the easterners with a fraction of the transportation costs compared with other goods. At their high points both whiskey and weed were so valuable that they were used as money. [see Terry Bouton, ‘William Findley, David Bradford, and the Pennsylvania Regulation of 1974’ in Revolutionary Founders: Rebels, Radicals, and Reformers in the Making of the Nation]
The burdens of taxation hit communities like these particularly hard. The whiskey rebels turned to the traditional form of protest to try and stop the tax collectors from charging distillers: armed mob threats against tax collectors, shutting down courts, and erecting liberty poles for gathering points. We’re pretty far away from seeing people using such tactics in 2018. However, a public banking movement has been boiling up for years now in both cities and states from Oakland to New Jersey. [Public Banking Movement Gains Grounds in Cities and States across the US] If the cannabis industry can rally for a bank that would accept its money as deposits it would be a complete game-changer, offering a beacon of light to the similar public banking projects already underway in 20 other states. [How Public Banking Is Winning the West]
Populist finance has seen a resurgence since the Occupy movement put the spotlight on the greed of private banks and the vast disparity in wealth between the rich and the rest of us. [link from occupy.com] While frontier regulators of the late-eighteenth century opposed all financial schemes, today progressives understand that dealing with massive wealth inequality will take drastic measures at the state and national levels. Taking on Wall Street will require more than agrarian regulators marching against the tax man or, in other words, good-old-fashioned direct action. California State Treasurer John Chiang has been conducting public hearings after the formation of the Cannabis Banking Working Group and there the public made its desire for public banking known. Instead of giving them the brush-off, Chiang responded positively and it seems the lobbying by public banking advocates has been met with some success. [Activists Urge California Public Bank not Limit to Cannabis Revenue] The issue now is whether or not the prospective new bank will be extended beyond just the cannabis industry to cover the needs of general California business.
These developments are encouraging for populist finance. In an era beset by financial parasitism and high private debt levels, public-based solutions to money and banking point the way towards prosperity and equality. What will follow is a story about two moments in American history that connects the populist practices of the whiskey-fueled past with our pot-blazing present.
Both Socialism and Populism have been invoked during Bernie Sanders’ presidential campaign run and this has led to no small amount of conceptual confusion among the American people – myself included. His rhetoric and record as a senator has been overwhelmingly anti-Wall Street, pro-worker, and, well, popular, so when I heard the label “Socialist” coming from the more conservative side from the mainstream media I thought it was another scare-tactic and then embraced it as a possible cure for our neoliberal malaise of debt-fueled Superimperialism [Michael Hudson’s latest on US Neoliberal Empire]. His brand of Socialism isn’t the type that conservatives would have you believe though, many avowed Socialists have even distanced themselves from Sanders. It came as somewhat of a surprise, but more of a moment of clarity, when Douglas Edwards (@SebastosPublius) tweeted to me that he is not in fact a Socialist but still demands support from the left in the way he steers the conversation in the media away from compromise with wealthy financiers and corporate giants embedded within the political process [How Wall Street Is Burning Democracy]. Continue reading “Socialism and/or Populism in America”
I participated in talk on the overarching and less-understood workings of the monetary system at the US Social Forum in San Jose, California last week called Who’s Money? Our Money! We’re working on getting a draft of the talking points together into one document, but here is the list of references we draw from in our research (you know, to prove we’re not crazy):
Icelandic Proposal: http://tinyurl.com/pwzwzpo
Positive Money Website: http://positivemoney.org/
Positive Money “Creating a Sovereign Money System.”: http://tinyurl.com/kgkk8rv
Bank of London “Money Creation in the Modern World.”: http://tinyurl.com/nnd7wwq
IMF Working Paper: The Chicago Plan Revisited : http://tinyurl.com/9vuqh3p
Ellen Brown’s “Web of Debt.”: http://tinyurl.com/npsvkr4
Ellen Brown’s The Public Banking Solution : http://tinyurl.com/pj5vdkd
USPS Office of the Inspector General “Providing Non-Bank Financial Services for the Underserved.” : http://tinyurl.com/m6jufyf
USPS OIG “The Road Ahead for Postal Financial Services.”: http://tinyurl.com/l4ujhf4
Elizabeth Warren “Coming to a Post Office Near You: Loans You Can Trust?”: http://tinyurl.com/paslzfn
Bank of North Dakota: http://banknd.nd.gov/
Federal Reserve System: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_System
Community Check Cashing, Oakland: http://communitycheckcashing.org/
Summary of the Article: “Geography determines destiny” without exception – unless stupidity creeps into the decision-maker’s minds.
In all seriousness though, what this good read fails to mention is the strategic need for the US’ apparent stupidity: ensuring the continued demand for dollars around the world. The need for other countries to borrow dollars to buy oil (the “petrodollar recycling system“) and protect their foreign reserve accounts from speculative raids has allowed the US to go into astronomical amounts of debt and not have to pay it off. The US doubled-down on its status as the purported “leader of the free world” in the mid-seventies and their is no going back now that they have run up an amount of debt that could never and will never be payed back.
The irony of the situation is that the US uses debt as its primary way to control other nations aside from military force but does not feel obliged to pay its own. The tragedy of the situation is that the transition away from this system is what will determine a large portion of the how world nations are made up in the coming century (as well as the fate of earth’s biosphere for the next 100,000 years), yet very few people understand it in a country that claims for itself the label ‘democracy’.
Most important for determining destiny is not just geography but the systemic movement of oil and money (be it in cash form or bits in electrical computer networks) on top of the earth. Oil comes from underneath the earth though and nations have their borders to look after, which are determined by oceans, mountains and other geographical barriers, (together of course with competing militaries and unruly subjects). Geopolitics brings international politics to mind and the ‘flows’ of oil and money that course through nations borders deserve to be included.
Someone or some body of people will have to persuade the US to not to unleash its war machine on other nations when the petrodollar system collapses, so that oil can be decoupled from money and renewable forms of energy (including less of it) can abound. Nations will not be able to transition away from fossil fuels when they cannot control their own money supply and have a imperial behemoth breathing down their neck. The chief barrier to the protection of a threatened biosphere is United States global hegemony. Perhaps an internal war machine to the US’ borders will apply the necessary pressure to ease the transition, or perhaps it will come from without. Then again, perhaps it will continue, but as far as I can tell, if the US prevails, you can kiss much of the life on this planet goodbye.
More on geopolitics from Michael Hudson:
A friend of mine asked me to explain what it means for Graeber to say that he is an anarchist in the context of money and banking and this was my response, expanded for the blog post:
Graeber calls himself a “little a” anarchist in that he is not tied down by the ideology or any of the big names in the canon and considers it a principle of practicing politics. Anarchism mostly just means “without rulers” and the model of decision-making, the process a meeting takes on, is more important to him and other practically-minded activists that also use it. It is called the consensus model and, when done right (which is actually much harder than he makes it out to be in my experience), it is an extremely powerful and uplifting tool for organizing ourselves. The ideal in the consensus model is that a solution to a problem is worked out through deliberation that everyone can agree on. Voting is not desired but sometimes necessary when the group gets too big, but the intention is that the best solution for all people involved is reached with everyone getting to participate.
So when he talks about himself as an anarchist, it is the consensus process and direct action outside of/without communication with government agencies that he is mostly referring to. It sure as hell worked wonders during the occupy movement, but there were plenty of other factors that propelled and also hampered that movement. When you break it down, (little-a) anarchism is about self-rule instead of command rule. In a general assembly, people don’t interrupt (I love this), get on a stack (a serial list of who will talk next), clarify and debate proposals, take “temperature-checks” (in lieu of voting), and communicate non-verbally with hand-signals. It is very involving and gives everyone a sense that their thoughts actually matter and will have an effect on the course of the greater body-politic.
This style of self-organization will have limits when it comes to making policy in the present state of government, so legitimacy in the agencies of power and our liberal society is definitely lacking. The model itself comes off as antagonistic to the rest of our law-based, market oriented society because it refuses to negotiate or make demands. Although, there is no reason why some group of folks couldn’t consent on doing so. An anarchist, on the other hand, tends to hate the state as a quasi-religious ideological tenet. It started out as a humanistic desire for a non-violent world where nations did not continually embroil their populations in ruinous wars. It has spread deeper into culture with punk music – “don’t tell me what to do!”, hippies – “make love not war, man”, and the general protest politics that got big in the sixties. From the mid 1800’s until then, it was mainly thought of in the political economy sense of an alternative to capitalism that espoused grassroots revolution against all forms of oppression. Worker movements like the IWW or Wobblies wanted to use the power of the recent uprisings for a world run by those who work rather than those who profit off of them. They tended to be nomadic and were better organized before they were crushed, provoking many strikes by workers toiling in horrid conditions.
There are anarchists who are utopian socialists and engage in prefigurative politics like the syndicalists, but they generally refuse to take power and limit themselves to something like: “destroy all the states in a total revolution with a maximally invigorated population!” What comes afterward is up to your imagination, but I think some of the more committed anarchists would just continue fighting whoever seizes the obviously inevitably power vacuum that would result – probably until they are all dead. I think Graeber and those like him would be less militaristic, opting instead for constant organizing to the side of whatever government takes shape. However, there is something inherently aggressive in occupying space and claiming it for your own, marching around nearby (loudly and breaking shit occasionally), and defying all other mandates and orders but those you have crafted on your own inside. He makes the point that the Occupy movement was the most non-violent movement of its size though, probably ever. He also makes the point that occupying is somewhat of an aggressive assertion of a mass of people.
Some anarchists like to emphasize the ancient times before states and organized religion as if they were the manifestation of a timeless grassroots earth-people. It’s actually kind of appealing, until you notice the romantic folly of mixing ideals from the present, the historical past, and the ancient past and saying that underneath them there’s a timeless one that I’ve got. Still though, mythology and elemental worshipping sounds better to me than monotheism – if you have to have something of a cohesive cultural understanding through spiritual agents.
As for the debt subordinating nations and democracy, he gets most of his economic insights from Michael Hudson. He’s just a far better writer. Hudson talks about the nefarious ways in which America subordinates other nations to its interests being largely a result of its international monetary practices between the large, economically and militarily powerful nations. The U.S. has operated on a double standard for decades and forced the victorious allies after both world wars to repay it for supplies. It was through unwavering debt repayment that the U.S. got Britain to relinquish its status as top nation in the world, and the money shortages after WWI due to debt services to the U.S. all but directly caused the Great Depression. Since then, as you probably know, nations are under the illusion that they need to borrow money before it is created. But is it a failure in economic thinking or a veiled threat from the U.S.? If nations begin to print their own money debt-free and do anything socialistic like nationalize their industries, their currency will be attacked and they will be targeted for regime change. The only nations big enough to challenge this system are on the move right now, but it is still unclear whether their policies will differ from the U.S., especially in terms of debt and money policies. The interests of bond and share holders and bankers earning interest at all levels of lending (even when it shouldn’t need to be lent), plus American hegemony across the globe has got to be what he means.
What gets me is how so few people know about this, yet it is the most powerful force shaping and constraining governments and people throughout the earth. There is a gigantic geopolitical battle going on right now over trade areas and currency, yet the American public is simply not informed about it. Did you hear about Putin’s proposal for a free-trade area throughout all of Europe? I think Eurasia might be slipping away from the U.S. I heard a military (probably Navy) commander speak on a Democracy Now sound bite about how the Trans-Pacific Partnership would be a major boon to his strategic efforts to control the Pacific – “as good as another aircraft carrier.” Hudson also points to the intertwining of neoliberal philosophy and American foreign policy.
To wrap up, I think anarchists like Graeber would be willing and able to understand this stuff. Between he and Taibbi, we finally have people that can communicate complicated stuff to the public. But anarchists strategy is all delegitimization and uprising; you can’t count on them to create a public bank.
Graeber discusses monetary policy in this article for the Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/18/truth-money-iou-bank-of-england-austerity. In his usual flowing style, he covers the history of money and how debt is built directly into money at its very source of creation in a breeze. I’ve written about it previously so I won’t go into it in depth, but the important thing in my eyes vis a vis anarchism is this question of how monetary reform could ever come from an anarchist movement espousing a consensus process. Here enters the concept of dual power:
“…the Occupy movement is ultimately based on what in revolutionary theory is often called a *dual power* strategy: we are trying to create liberated territories outside of the existing political, legal, and economic order, on the principle that that order is irredeemably corrupt. It is a space that operates to what extent it is possible, outside the apparatus of government and its claims of a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.” The Democracy Project: A History, a Crisis, a Movement
A burning question for someone like me who is interested in the undeniable force and vivacity of grassroots political organizing and the comfort it brings at meetings, and reclaiming the power to create money for the public is this: how can we reconcile these two opposing positions in the vein of the old populist movements around the turn of the century? The self-imposed distance from the state will make anarchist movements unwilling to touch any kind of policy objectives, no matter how transformative and how beneficial they would be to the current economic realities that most people must endure today. And yet, the greatest impediment to the liberating goals of revolutionaries is the debt structured central bank and international financial institution rule – a rule that would most easily be broken by the reinstating of sovereign money creation by governments and not private banks. Public control of money creation and distribution is more powerful in terms of confronting global oppression than any seizure of power in the traditional revolutionary sense. Such a “reform” in any individual nation would certainly travel very far in our hyper-connected age, the ripple effects of which would eventually turn power relations upside down.
So do we abandon these practices and start campaigning for political parties that would enact these reforms, form “broad coalitions” with public interest groups, and appeal to big-spender representatives with a list of demands? We should never allow ourselves to be pressured into taking sides on anyone else’s terms before we consider the options placed before us and determine if such a decision is actually required of us. Graeber’s appeal to dual power allows us to consider two different opposing forms of power and organization at once, not having to make them both find a common ground. Consensus-based direct action works well in autonomous spaces for non-bureaucratic people. Representatives regulating the money supply of a nation and administering loans at the local level would work too. The latter operates with the backing of national governments and organized military violence. The former an ideal of peaceful villagers cooperating amiably. Neither models are wholly adequate, but neither do we have to insist that they work out their differences and gel together to make the one right model. Such would be a forced choice insisting that we have one political identity and eliminate all other contradictory beliefs.
Expanding on the dual power concept Graeber elaborates on four different recent political strategies for turning grassroots political movement into sustained machines that have influenced their regions greatly.
The Sadr Strategy: armed militias with top-down discipline like those found in Iraq, which are much more likely to eventually become political parties and require a culturally cohesive base.
The San Andés Strategy: Zapatista organizations that fight and negotiate with national governments to keep their seized territory.
The El Alto Strategy: as found in Bolivia, “using autonomous institutions as the base to win a role in government and maintaining them as a directly democratic alternative completely separate from government”, which then elect representatives while putting “enormous pressure [on them] to do exactly the opposite of what they elected them to do.” This gives those representatives even more negotiating power.
The Buenos Aires Strategy: “try to strip [the political establishment] of all legitimacy.” This apparently worked in Argentina to default on its international debt. “… doing so set off a cascade of events that nearly destroyed international enforcement agencies like the International Monetary Fund, and effectively ended the Third World debt crisis.”
One gets the feeling that to enact major monetary reform would require delegitimization from populist grassroots movements *plus* inside economic policy makers pushing good ideas for public financing.