The BRICS Bank and Dollar Hegemony: the Importance of Geopolitics

Michael Hudson and Leo Panitch had a spirited debate at the Real News Network recently that brought to light two different views on the strategies for resisting Capitalism. Watch it hear and follow along with the transcript:

Is the BRICS Bank a Challenge to US Financial Power?

The BRICS Development Bank (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South America) was just announced and is an attempt to subvert America’s dollar hegemony or, what Hudson calls, Super Imperialism. They will make loans outside of the dollar system, which coerces/persuades countries that receive loans from the IMF to keep their currencies pegged to the dollar, and issue loans to countries in their own currencies. This, Hudson believes, will be a major geopolitical move by countries extremely frustrated by the Washington Consensus in America and will provide an alternative to the broken philosophy of neoliberalism and its Trojan Horse policy of forcing countries to accept austerity, privatization, and cheap asset sell-offs to private companies when sovereign countries cannot pay back their debts. Rather than write down debts that cannot be repaid, the IMF and World Bank (who accept and champion the dollar standard) demand “developing countries” who cannot keep up with entrenched global corporations on the world market sell away their natural resources, privatize public services and industry (including pensions and health benefits), and generally accept nation-wide austerity when the interest on the loan bloats the bill too high.

A recent case of this comes from Argentina. Argentina was going to write down its debts so that it could repay without crippling its economy until the “Vulture Firms” who bought up some of its debts at very low, distressed prices and demanded they be relayed in full. A New York judge decided that Argentina must make the Vulture Firms whole, with many big Wall Street Banks owning stakes in these vultures. Such is the logic of debt intoxicating countries under financial imperialism, demanding all debts be repaid. Whole peoples wealth and well-being can be sacrificed, but heaven forbid an investor should not get the full amount of capital returned on his investment!

Leo Panitch, however, believes that the significance of the BRICS Development Bank in combating US led neoliberalism is overblown. These five countries all themselves operate as Capitalist economies, forcing their population into low-waged labor and engaging in land purchases around the globe. Oligarchs dominate Russia, ghettos abound in Brazil, farmers have been committing suicide by the thousands, and everyone must submit to the toil of the work day for their livelihood. These aren’t Socialist countries we’re talking about.

Why is the issuing of loans in the currency of a sovereign nation instead of dollars so important for opposing neoliberalism and, eventually, Capitalism itself?

It depends on how much you think American foreign policy and its war machine is bound up with the character and functioning of global economies – whether they could go Socialist or whether they would still choose by themselves to remain fully Capitalist. Does the “room for maneuver” that Panitch says the BRICS alliance is seeking create a whole new place where countries can more democratically reorganize or are they merely jockeying for more of the Capitalist pie?

Hudson emphasizes the Geopolitical where Panitch emphasizes the social forms; I would like to explain why geopolitics (the position of nations on the Earth, the resources they contain, their strategic location for war and trade routes, etc.) is crucial in determining the course of action that a country can take. Countries’ decisions on how their goods and services will be distributed are not merely internal decisions based on voting or their succumbing to the overarching logic of Capitalism. Monetary flows that are unleashed on markets and colonial histories play a major role in shaping the options a country has in taking on the social form it has at any given time. One might call them “external pressures”, but monetary flows and debt levels operate with fluidity and course through countries boundaries according to policies and decisions made at the IMF, World Bank, and Washington DC. If a new development bank would appear that would be more willing to cancel debts and make low interest rate loans, a fundamental shift could occur that would free up a countries’ ability to change its socials forms. The big question, yet to be answered, is whether the BRICS Development Bank will be willing to cancel/write down debt, i.e. whether the credit that is pumped into global markets will be for the purpose of productive works and projects that people need or for making a return at all any “external” cost. Will they be neoliberal financial parasites by another name?

The blight of austerity ravaging the world, of which there seems no end in sight, is largely driven by American Politics: which has been captured by the financial interests of Too-Big-To-Fail Banks and extractive parasites. Their main weapon is debt and interest. The dollar standard ensures that, internationally, sovereign nations must keep their currencies at a fixed rate to the dollar or else leave those currencies open to crippling currency raids and Short Sells. Here is Ellen Brown:

“[After the dollar was taken off of the gold standard] Currencies were now valued merely by their relative exchange rates in the “free” market. Foreign exchange markets became giant casinos, in which the investors were just betting on the relative positions of different currencies. Smaller countries were left at the mercy of the major players – whether other countries, multinational corporations or multinational banks – which could radically devalue national currencies just by selling them short on the international market in large quantities. These currency manipulations could be so devastating that they could be used to strong-arm concessions from target economies. (Web of Debt, p.207)”

Hudson in The Bubble and Beyond writes about the constraining system set up by the dollar standard:

“A double standard has been implicit in the world’s economic rules since the dollar was decoupled from gold in 1971, when the U.S. trade deficit of $10 billion was the equivalent of more than half the U.S. gold stock. But today there is no gold convertibility and hence no major constraint on U.S. spending abroad or at home. The United States has not subjected itself to any of the distressing fiscal conditions that all other countries feel obliged to follow. What makes this asymmetry so ironic is that it was made possible by what seemed to be a financial defeat for the United States. Once America stopped paying gold, there was not much that other central banks could ask for as they found themselves flooded with dollars obtained by private-sector exporters and asset sellers in excess of their need…

…Now that gold had been demonetized, all that foreign central banks can do with their excess dollars is to send them back to the U.S. Government by buying Treasury bonds. If they do not do this, their currencies will surge against the dollar, threatening to price their manufacturers and food exporters out of foreign markets.” (p.368)

The United States of America is an a unique, privileged position in the geopolitical dynamic of forces: it alone gets to run up its debt without limit and maintain a “balance-of-payment” deficit without ever having to pay its debt back. The interest that it must pay for the Treasury bonds it issues are simply added to the debt pile it already has built up. The U.S. Federal Reserve can keep printing dollars and issuing Treasury bonds to match them (the government must borrow in order to create new money), while other countries must use their dollars to buy more Treasury bonds. The Treasury bond nets its buyers money on interest, but that interest paid out by the U.S. comes from printing more money – issuing more T-Bonds.

This “recycling process” fuels U.S. National debt and at the same time ensures that other countries keep using dollars that they obtain from selling their exports to America, foreign company buy-outs, and IMF loans. In international finance, America has become a black hole of debt: other nations receive a glut of dollars must “send them back to the U.S. Government by buying Treasury bonds. If they do not do this, their currencies will surge against the dollar, threatening to price their manufacturers and food exporters out of foreign markets” (Hudson, TBaB p.368). These are currency wars performed almost entirely on computer screens and with the frightening threat of falling to the bottom of a hostile world market when your currency becomes over-valued (relative to the dollar and the value of goods). Suddenly all of the work your country has performed to create products and grow food will be un-tradable because it will cost to much for other countries to convert their own currency into yours for the exchange. This is constraining force burdening the “developing countries” (“developing” because they must export to “developed” countries or else face default or the impending hostile military takeover) to use dollars and continue to finance the U.S. and its war machine.

Michael Hudson is one of the few people to understand this mechanism and has been yelling about it since the early seventies. Few others understand it, but when you do, the importance of not using the dollar – freeing up the room to use one’s own currency for receiving loans and trade with other countries not denominated in dollars – becomes a huge move to open up possibilities for economic activity.

David Graeber writes about this mechanism at the end of his book Debt: The First 5,000 Years:

“Because of the United States trade deficits, huge numbers of dollars circulate outside the country; and one effect of Nixon’s floating of the dollar was that foreign central banks have little they can do with these dollars except use them to buy U.S. Treasury bonds. This is what is meant by the dollar becoming the world’s “reserve currency.”…

…The effect, though, is that American imperial power is based on a debt that will never – can never – be repaid…
…At the same time, U.S. policy was to insist that those countries relying on U.S. Treasury bonds as their reserve currency behave in exactly the opposite way as they did: observing tight money policies and scrupulously repaying their debts.” (p.366-7)

Both realize that this is a special position for the U.S. to be in and reinforces imperial authority in a very efficient, monetary way. Capitalism might have spread throughout the globe, with countries and their ruling classes forcing their people into a reserve of cheap labor and the strict adherence to property rights among other coercions, but the method used for getting new countries to accept this state of affairs is an age old tactic: interest and debt. More from Graeber:

“The new global currency is rooted in military power even more firmly than the old was. Debt peonage continues to be the main principle in of recruiting labor globally: either in the literal sense, in much of East Asia or Latin America, or in the subjective sense, whereby most of those working for wages or even salaries feel that they are doing so primarily to pay off interest-bearing loans.” (p.368)

Getting out of the Capitalist trap will involve financial maneuvering in the national-geopolitical landscape as much as labor struggles because the power of the logic of debt is so great, taking its most global and destructive manifestation to date with American Super Imperialism or Dollar Hegemony. The linking of the influence of debt and military might means that whenever a country attempts to get out of the debt/dollar system, the military steps in to enforce U.S. interests. Saddam Hussein’s Iraq stopped trading in dollars and went for euros in 2000 as well as Iran in 2001. As long as dollars are used in the deal America will win, but if anyone steps out of line and rejects the dollar the hammer comes down. This is why only a large block of high producing nations can legitimately challenge dollar hegemony, unless America’s corporate media is so thoroughly corrupt that it can convince its people a war on China, Russia, Brazil, South Africa and India. It is already demonizing Russia and China the best it can, the two largest players…

Both Hudson and Panitch are anti-Capitalist political-economic thinkers. They both wish to see a Socialist government that can restructure economies to stop apocalyptic climate change and promote prosperity absent the dominance of Capital. Hudson, though, is peering deeper into geopolitics and the forces moving and controlling nations to act in certain predictable ways to find a way out of Imperial U.S. led global Capitalism. A new development bank, though not as uplifting and energizing as a revolutionary uprising, is a glimmer of hope that will change the dominant forces operating all around the Earth if the BRICS countries do it right. All that is left is to see if the BRICS Development Bank will use money and credit solely as a means to serve their Capitalist classes vs the U.S.’s or whether the credit they lend will allow countries the means to invest in national infrastructure that will stop climate change and provide for the public health and food security.

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Did the Other Shoe Just Drop? Big Banks Hit with Monster $250 Billion Lawsuit in Housing Crisis

billrosethorn:

The next credit crisis will be much larger than 2008, how we will distribute goods and services without a free-flowing credit/debt creation machine (in the banks) will likely determine the type of society we will have in the near future.

Originally posted on WEB OF DEBT BLOG:

Wicked Witch of the East

For years, homeowners have been battling Wall Street in an attempt to recover some portion of their massive losses from the housing Ponzi scheme. But progress has been slow, as they have been outgunned and out-spent by the banking titans.

In June, however, the banks may have met their match, as some equally powerful titans strode onto the stage.  Investors led by BlackRock, the world’s largest asset manager, and PIMCO, the world’s largest bond-fund manager, have sued some of the world’s largest banks for breach of fiduciary duty as trustees of their investment funds. The investors are seeking damages for losses surpassing $250 billion. That is the equivalent of one million homeowners with $250,000 in damages suing at one time.

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Guattari’s Schizoanalytic Cartographies

billrosethorn:

Brian Holmes navigates global cybernetic capitalism with the help of Guattari’s Schizoanalytic Cartographies.

Originally posted on Continental Drift:

or, the Pathic Core at the Heart of Cybernetics

terrestrial_celestial2

[This text was developed through a large number of improvised presentations. Thanks to all who listened and responded. The very first, in Chicago at the invitation of Jon Cates,  is archived here. - BH]

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A desiring mind seeks infinity, and finds it today in a proliferation of signals: electromagnetic waves beaming down from the skies, fiber-optic cables emerging from the seas, copper wires woven across the continents. The earthly envelope of land, air and ocean – the realm of organic life, or biosphere – is doubled by a second skin of electronically mediated thought: the noosphere. It’s a vast, pulsating machine: a coded universe grown complex beyond our grasp, yet connected at every pulse to the microscopic mesh of nerve cells in our flesh.

Such is the contemporary circuit of communication. Its existence raises two basic questions. What…

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Super Imperialism: Michael Hudson on Dollar Hegemony

One year after the United States dropped its currency backing from gold, Michael Hudson saw a new power formation taking shape and wrote a book called Super Imperialism: The Origins and Fundamentals of U.S. World Dominance. He saw a new dynamic taking place that few would notice in the 1970’s and that few notice still today: America has either planned for or stumbled upon a technique for Imperial rule across the globe that has never before been seen in history. The United States has found a way to use their situation as a heavily indebted nation as leverage for forcing nations around the world to pay it modern day imperial tribute. Due to the complex relationships and mechanisms of central banks and international economic power disparities, America has built an empire based on debt, consumption, currency values, and war that has never appeared before on the earth. I will focus on Chapter 15 of his big book The Bubble and Beyond called America’s Monetary Imperialism for its short, dense explanation of Super Imperialism.

The dynamic that allows for this economic imperialism is very much graspable – it only requires a few steps of reasoning – but it is clouded in economic-speak. Michael Hudson has done a brilliant job in making understandable Super-Imperialism, but I am going to try and explain it again without inducing too much headache. It has taken many weeks of reading, rereading (an excessively marked up text), talking with friends, and talking in the Politics of Debt reading group to come to grippes with it, but this is perhaps the most important phenomenon encircling the earth and the most formidable barrier to enacting global change.

To begin, money in Europe has been backed by a material substance like gold or silver (bullion) since the rise of colonial empires ransacking the Americas and the end of the Middle Ages. The U.S. officially joined the gold standard crew in 1944 during the Bretton Woods system, and since it had most of the gold had the dollar become the reserve currency. In 1971, President Nixon took the United States, by far the most productive and affluent nation on the planet, off of the gold standard. No longer would the value of the American dollar be “pegged” or “coupled” to a fixed value denominated in the weight of gold. Having a steady, base supply of some universally acknowledged material to rest behind the value of a currency makes international trade easier and the currency value less erratic. A standard system of weights and measures allows for many parties to feel safe in exchanging currencies, knowing full well what everyone else will value the money they possess in the same way. A stamped bullion coin or paper money redeemable in a bullion substance would be trusted and retain its value in spite of fluctuating particular country’s currency values – so the logic goes. But this bullion system fixes the value of money so well that the coins or paper needed to pay taxes and conduct business can become scarce. When the supply of a currency runs out, people and states will no longer have the means to conduct trade and might default on their obligations to pay back loans, bonds, and other debt/borrowing instruments.

Today, to facilitate global international trade, currency values are measured against the dollar of which it appears there is no limit. Due to the U.S. leaving the Bretton Woods System of a common gold standard, the standard shifted from the gold backed dollar to just the dollar. Instead of the base measure of value being something scarce as in gold and other bullion, the dollar itself became the standard and could be printed and keyboard-stroked into existence at the behest of the Federal Reserve and lent out wherever – creating a glut of money. Sound inflationary? It is. Since the Federal Reserve was created in 1914, the dollar has lost ~95% of its purchasing power. In other words, things should be a lot cheaper to buy.

The United States of America had been borrowing heavily to finance its deadly and ill-fated war in Vietnam. The costs were skyrocketing and other nations were demanding that the U.S. be able to repay for the bonds it issued – in gold. The American economy was in a recession and its currency was shrinking relative to its supply of gold. The result of these pressures including the limitations on how much money could be spent by the U.S. military due to it’s massive debt run-up was the executive decision to simply unpeg and decouple the US dollar from the gold standard:

“A double standard has been implicit in the world’s economic rules since the dollar was decoupled from gold in 1971, when the U.S. trade deficit of $10 billion was the equivalent of more than half the U.S. gold stock. But today there is no gold convertibility and hence no major constraint on U.S. spending abroad or at home. The United States has not subjected itself to any of the distressing fiscal conditions that all other countries feel obliged to follow.” (Hudson, 368)

The US dollar could now be printed without limit. The US military could spend without limit. The deficits that the US treasury could run up had no limit. The United States could only do this because of its privileged position relative to the rest of the world nations: it was a military powerhouse and had a bustling economy. Other nations relied on the US consumer-based economy to sell their exports to, while they worried about the great disparity created by their military build up:

“The world still remembers how it was the Vietnam War that forced America off gold, as the US balance-of-payments deficit during the 1960’s stemmed entirely from overseas military spending. By 1971 the United States stopped redeeming foreign-held dollars in gold, and the dollar ceased to be a gold proxy. As the U.S. payments deficit shifted to the private sector, it expressed itself in the form of a demand for foreign products. This was welcomed by foreign countries on the grounds that at least it helped spur their domestic employment. But America’s military adventurism has no visible side benefits for Europe, Asia, or other countries. It has given the U.S. Treasury-bill standard the coloration of a political and military threat as well as being merely an economic form of exploitation.” (Hudson, 369)

The standard of gold had been shifted to the standard of US Treasury bills. Now that the burden of a fixed relationship between the dollar and gold had been removed, Treasury bills could be loaned out and dollars could be printed on the promise that America could pay them back with interest. Dollars would be loaned out to “developing countries” through the IMF and World Bank (which, of course, submit to the dollar standard) and any surpluses that these countries earn must be recycled into more U.S. Treasury bills by market constraints I will describe below. The size and scope of the US economy and the flood of money coming in to developing countries (as well as the coercion of economic hit-men and the neoliberal austerity/free-trade theories) convinced them to receive the glut of dollars to finance their industrial expansion. Mainly, developing countries would use these dollars to build up their productive enterprise and sell their exports on the world market, with the US sucking in much of the goods produced overseas.

“Now that the dollar had been demonetized, all that foreign central banks can do with their excess dollars is send them back to the U.S. Government by buying Treasury Bonds. If they do not do this, their currencies will surge against the dollar, threatening to price their manufacturers and food exporters out of foreign markets.” (Hudson, 368)

The constraints forced on non-U.S. countries to pay back their debts were not felt by the U.S. itself: being the primary hegemony both militarily and economically, the U.S. can spend whatever it likes and go into debt as much as it wants. Doing this actually helps the U.S. maintain the Imperial order of global trade and resource appropriation from developing countries via the asymmetry in the demand to repay debts and global market competition. This is the strange opposition, whereby an indebted country has been de facto colonizing other nations with surpluses from their trade: the U.S. goes into debt to finance military build up among other things (though obviously not for improving the lives of its own citizens) and the rest of the world must send their surpluses back to debt-empire, if they make a surplus at all. Of course, if “undeveloped” countries do not do well on the world market by selling all of the goods from their land with modernized production and (usually) cheap labor, they must pay back their debts (unlike the U.S.). To ensure this happens, austerity ravages the national purse and sucks the money out of an economy more forcefully and public agencies, enterprises, and infrastructure are privatized. The U.S. elite will get their tribute, whether by dollar-backed “ordinary” market means (a flood of dollars which must be used continually or else leave them at a trade disadvantage) or else austerity enforcement that demands the debts be payed with interest regardless of the performance of the economy in the world market.

Hudson summarizes a bit:

“Unlike former modes of Imperialism, it is a strategy that only one power, the united stares has been able to employ. Also novel is the fact the U.S. Treasury-bond standard does not rely on the corporate profits or the drives of private companies investing in other countries to extract profits and interest. Monetary Imperialism operates primarily through the balance of payments and central bank agreements, which ultimately are government functions. It occurs between the U.S. Government and the central banks of nations running balance of pavement surpluses. The larger their surpluses grow, the more U.S. Treasury securities they are obliged to buy.” (Hudson,370)

All non-U.S. countries are in a bind that forces them to support America’s military “adventurism” abroad. If the massive loans they receive to industrialize do not work out, their debts are collected on at the expense of public services, jobs are lost, and the people flee the destitution in their own land. If they succeed in world markets and play ball with the dollar, they enable the U.S. Treasury to continue selling it’s Bonds and Bills and increase the disposable money or liquidity (money is a very liquid substance under the fiat system vs. solid gold) to finance credit creation all over the globe. Their currencies being tied to the dollar standard, they are obliged (read: economically constrained) to keep currencies devalued, which in turn keeps them tied to the international market system and sends their natural resources away as exports.

The crux of this phenomenon is the dollar standard: because every other currency is denominated in dollars when they trade internationally, the U.S. feels empowered run up its national debt and continue to pay back the interest on the Treasury Bonds it sells with even more Treasury Bonds.

The people clamoring about the national debt astronomic expansion don’t usually make the connection between the debt and its imperial function of suppressing foreign currency values. Likewise, Modern Monetary Theorists who believe the national debt can be run-up without limit because of the governments status as a currency issuer also fail to take into account international dollar hegemony and the effect it has on global markets and the geopolitics of imperialism. A currency does not need to be created with debt attached to it: “[Foreign countries'] Treasuries can create their own money based on their own economic needs rather than letting their central bank reserves be a derivative of the U.S. payments deficit.” (Hudson,378). The IMF-American hegemony on world markets has built up such a giant house-of-cards that getting off of the dollar standard would be risky and upset the by far and away most superior military force on the earth. America’s massive national debt is proportional to its military might.

“Using debtor leverage to set the terms on which it will refrain from causing monetary chaos, America has turned seeming financial weakness into strength. U.S. Government debt has reached so large a magnitude that any attempt to replace it will entail an interregnum of financial chaos and political instability. American diplomats have learned that they are well positioned to come out on top in such grab-bags.” (Hudson,374)

In other words, if any country tries to subvert the dollar standard the military will bring down the hammer. This is why the Russia-China deal to strengthen economic ties in Asia and Eastern Europe in response to sanctions put on Russia for the Ukraine-Cyprus episode is so important: a new block that could successfully subvert the dollar hegemony would be a major geopolitical power maneuver. Hudson sees this dollar hegemony mechanism at work in the Ukraine standoff between Russia and America. It is probably the main reason why the U.S. is pushing so hard on “fast-tracking” the Trans-Pacific Partnership, forcefully and secretly opening up Asia and pretty much the entire Pacific Ocean to unregulated, wild-west Capitalism to counter China’s growing influence as a trading power. As long as these major economic zones with resource-rich lands and cheap labor are using the dollar standard, they will be forced into the vicious cycle of buying Treasury Bonds and exporting their goods overseas – further financing military spending.

Again, thanks to dollar standard and the double standard, whereby the U.S. gets to run up its debts while other countries must honor them and other countries must measure their currency value relative to the this debt-based currency, it doesn’t matter that the U.S. debt climbs sky-high. The national debt actually solidifies America’s position as the central market player regardless of well it does in GDP growth. The black hole of American debt and consumption draws in all of the money that countries make on the private market from exports back into the Treasury Bonds that will guarantee a decent return, but just add on to the U.S. national debt. America feels it can keep printing dollars and loaning them out to whomever because in between the time it takes to pay off the debt that comes attached to the Treasury Bond credit, private businesses have already sucked in the goods of these productive and indebted borrowing countries. If they don’t pay it back, the austerity hawks come flying in. America gets to continue running up its debt because the countries it imports from get loads of dollars, which they can only recycle back into more Treasury Bonds. The dollar becomes like a black hole that all currency must spiral back into when countries with different currencies profit off of global market trading.

Hudson:

“[The United States] pays for its net imports and buyouts of foreign industry [typo] with Treasury bonds that its diplomats have long hinted they have little intention of paying off. Central banks end up with paper or electronic IOUs bearing 4 or 5 percent interest, which the U.S. simply adds to the balance of what it owes, while U.S. investors but foreign companies, resources and hitherto public enterprise expected to yield in the neighborhood of 20 percent in earnings and capital gains.” (Hudson,374) *my italics.

The dollars received for real tangible things like public infrastructure, products shipped out on the supply chains, and the benefits of the land are nearly universally valuable in the short run, but, if confidence in the U.S. Treasury to pay back the ever-increasing debt and growth in the U.S. economy dwindles, the long term viability of the dollar will be made obvious and collapse. And since the Federal Reserve has decided to rescue insolvent predator banks that are massively leveraged against real assets with securities and derivatives, the hopes for a return to growth and an even more bustling U.S. economy not burdened by parasitic banksters are looking more and more bleak. On the domestic side,

“… the U.S. real estate and financial bubble has been welcomed as post-industrial “wealth creation,” it is rendering the American economy uncompetitive in world markets and hence unable to pay off its foreign debt by running a trade surplus. U.S. labor is obliged to pay for high-cost housing and pay debt service on the loans it needs to stay afloat in today’s economy.” (Hudson,372)

The infinite demand of debt repayment extends not just to foreign countries but to America’s own people. When the latest speculation caused bubble popped in 2008, the Fed decided to bail out insolvent banks and let them continue their destructive easy-money siphoning behavior while most Americans are teetering on the edge of missing their monthly expense payments. As has been well reported (but never enough), America is one of the most unequal nations on earth, far more than the population even believes it to be. This is largely because of a minuscule amount of financiers earning economic rent on artificially inflated assets, which Hudson details in other parts of the book.

All of this means bad times are ahead if the system of money flows and debt repayment disparities are not drastically altered. The biggest and most glaring issue is that the U.S. has demonstrated that it is willing to flex its military muscles at the behest of its elites and could very well spin the almost totally corporate controlled media into believing that it is checking some other nation’s aggression by going to war. An economic alliance of non-dollar using countries like the industrially productive nations of Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRICs) could subvert the U.S.’s hegemony by selecting an alternative currency to base all of their transactions on, but how anyone could challenge the United States militaries intervention on behalf of the bankers and capitalists is any bodies guess. Delegitimizing domestic protest and other internal strife that threatens the life of the vampire squid is where one of the most important sites of conflict will be in the global market dominance game.

The American war machine, coupled with the financiers is a powerful block that is desperately trying to maintain the massive wealth and power it has built up. With looming earth-systems collapse on the horizon, the military will do what it has always done in times of crisis and financiers will never let go of the money they have gained by their political maneuvering. Achieving reform like the tariffs for the sake of monetary symmetry that Hudson recommends will be difficult and receive hard pressure with all of the tools at the disposal of an elite financier-capitalist class. Hudson is a rare thinker who understands the need for large debt write-downs for those which cannot and where not designed to payed back in full. The economic gains of the financial class are entirely debt-leveraged and should be taxed away. What comes after a potential jubilee debt-cancellation or Debt Strike will be the really interesting part: a return to competitively growing global markets and military imperialism would only raise the specter of disastrous global warming. A steady-state economy that is built on stopping expansion of production as well as allocating money more equally is the only kind of “reform” that earth and its unfortunately “developed” people could be grateful for.

Be sure to check out his website as well as videos like these:

http://youtu.be/sjV5FEKVs8A

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A Day in the City

Woke up late agin. 12:30 I think. Got on the mobile device to hit up a friend of mine I was suppose to meet earlier in the day. Eventually I get it together and pour some coffee and smoke a rolled up cigarette. Man have I been hitting the smokes lately. After sufficient waking time, I hop on the bike and ride the Metro over to the City.

I’m late. Can’t seem to be on time anymore, not that we ever set a definitive time. He’s already been to the park we were going to meet at, come home and gotten ready for a nap, sunburned. I drag him down to let me in to his living space filled with anti-capitalist, anti-state, and generally anti-society art and literature strewn all over the place. This has become a comfort zone for me, a reprieve. Big common area, tables and couches, and a general do-what-you-like attitude pervade. (It’s gone?)

We walk to the park (his second time today) gabbing about the meaning of privilege and its effectiveness in shutting people up who would otherwise resist vs. encouraging those who currently wouldn’t have without it. Looking back, it amazes me how fluent I’ve become in the lingo of the anti-caps – it literally just streams out my mouth when I relax with friends.

We approach the hilly park full of young and colorful people grouped up into small corpuscles. Each little crew has managed to separate themselves from each other by establishing a common distance between them that could probably be measured within a margin of error of a few inches. I make sure to comment on the lack of consciousness in the park. Only now (writing this) am I taken aback at the strangeness of myself commenting on the “consciousness of the masses.” Remembering the days of blissful indifference takes concerted reflection; my self-confidence, together with a willingness towards self-criticism, has entrenched a defiant stance that I’m happy to keep.

We lie on the grass and talk – it’s getting hotter. We’ve done this before. Sprawling out a few zines and books on the ground between us, philosophy of the European flavor plus what some might call “ultra-left” pamphlets, and begin. He’s a declared egoist, anti-civ guy and I’m fine with it. We’re past he initial pointing out of obvious hypocrisies and ironies; we know the situation we’re in, the systemic impasse. We speak together precisely because of this, because we can see the composition of forces constricting us, and we’re willing to change it. It is a question of how at this point. The fuel to light the fire already exists: we need a trajectory.

I speak about the labyrinth metaphor and its connection with another article that was laid on me by a mutual friend. One was about the labyrinth of the history of science & philosophy, the other about the labyrinth of a situationist’s dérive through the city that begins and ends with a undeveloped hint at “the occupy thing”. In a dérive, the city does the guiding. The specificities of the urban environment are supposed to do the directing, while the ambience invokes and provokes the participants around. The article seemed to suggest the entrance and exit to the labyrinth of the city lay in occupying the square, with so much history, geography, and ideas mashed in the middle. He drops me another article by the same author about negation and ethics. I would read it later that night in my bed.

We muse about civilization, humanity, the Earth, the police… On the way back we agree about the clarity to be found in the revelation that there is an enemy to position oneself against – an enemy with its vice grip on the future. But I stop and launch into another improvised digression on the choosing of one’s enemies. An antagonism born of revenge against the lowly denizens appears trite within the context of the thoroughgoing disintegration of the system of the Earth by the system of Capital. One’s enemies tell much about who one is. Yet we cannot seemed to get beyond the police.

Having family obligations I must depart. We have discussed enough words and theory to chew on until our next meeting. After all, he’s facing a legal battle over his living space that demands clarity of language. The pain of departing from my friends had grown noticeably more acute since things have died down. So much so that within the last half-hour or so, a feeling of forlornness dawns on me early and we tarry about his space.

The spot has since been evicted. The building was bought and they were kicked out of the city by the new dollar-eyed landowner. I don’t often go to that part of the city anymore.

I arrive late for the show. The doors have closed and I will not see the play that my family has invited me to. Instead I grab a beer at a sports bar and watch the end of a baseball game. An old gay man stands at the corner of the bar and talks about his 15-minutes of fame: he was arrested at the Supreme Court of New York to protest for gay rights and I eat it up. He spoke of the arresting officers not knowing where to take him, so they just kept leading him down the macabre catacombs of the Supreme Court building that eventually turned into a sandy basement. I remember the intentionally soft voice of his – like a children’s story reader enrapturing little kids – as he repeated “going down, down, down…” I get bits of the article my friend gave me in-between him, the game, and the cheerful tourist couple to my left. I make a note of being in between an old man having already lived through his activist glory days and an out-of-town couple looking for something novel and distinct about this city.

When I left the bar I stopped to pick up some tobacco on the advice of a particularly hostile homeless man who for some reason took a liking to me. I give him a cigarette when I come out and we talk briefly about something forgettable. Making my way down the street I find that the show is over and everyone has left. Unable to contact my family for lack of internet access, I linger a bit longer in the Metropolis and talk to some more homeless people. I even shout at a security guard trying to move a guy away from his employer’s doorway, but this guy is too feeble and incoherent to realize what I have done for him.

I wander around the roads a bit more, biking up hills and avoiding speedy cars. I expel some more energy into the city streets, not really sure where I am going. Stopping at a small convergence spot near a public transit section, I roll another cigarette and tentatively look for another random conversation. Someone starts talking about my bike and we compare them with flattery. The slightly larger than usual sidewalk is surrounded by fast-food restaurants, a large neon-lit bar, a fancy hotel and a chic department store. There are pockets of people grouped-up and traveling in different directions. They scan each other, make short loud cries of laughter, and try to maintain a sense of direction. I stand with my cigarette observing everyone with my buzzed and oddly curious gaze. “Creepy dude” they must be thinking. Finally, I decide to go home. When I arrive, I feel grateful for having a house.

Many messages are on my mobile device when I get home. My family is wondering where I am. My absence must be felt considering my righteous intensity as of late. I reply to one: “I’m not coming, don’t worry about it.” I pause at this last word and wonder about whether to go with “it” or “me”. “Don’t worry about *it.” … “Don’t worry about *me.” …

I decide this isn’t about me at all, it is about the situation.

(Written in summer 2012)

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Mad Men’s Commune

In episode 4 of the current season 7 of Mad Men, one of the central characters in Roger Sterling has a run-in with a hippy commune in upstate New York. Sterling’s daughter has run away, leaving behind her five year-old son to find happiness in a new living situation. The episode brings up some simple yet potent points about the family structure and hierarchical structures in general. The presence of hierarchy and the father figure have been important themes of contention throughout the show, as seen in the intricate dynamics of working at a New York City firm and living in a 1960’s white suburban household at the height of American power. Generally, the show has handled the trials of women and minorities in a male-dominated world very well, with moments of subtle and not-so-subtle imbalances in gendered power relations. But this episode was especially eye-opening for its giving the viewer a glimpse at an alternative living situation outside of the city and suburbia that actively tried to counter family-based power structures. At stake is the morals attached to such a patriarchic family structure and how well Mad Men’s commune subverts them.

Roger Sterling first gets word of his daughter Margaret’s flight to utopia at his office from both his ex-wife Mona and his son-in law who married her. The two are in conflict about whether to even enlist Roger for help and Roger ends up siding with his son-in-law: he should go as the husband to fetch Margaret back and reunite the family. Mona tries to push Roger to head the retrieval party: “A father is a powerful thing”, she says. But Roger abdicates and agrees with his son-in-law: “Let the man be a man!”, he fires back at his ex-wife. But the husband fails and instead of convincing her to come and resume her duties as mother he gets in a fight at a bar and winds up in jail. So Roger and his ex-wife journey through beat-up country roads to try and pull their daughter off of the commune and back into her family role as a mother.

The two together fail as Mona is far too insistent, laying guilt upon her daughter for abandoning her son (breaking the family line, so to speak), but Roger is far more suave. As an accounts man at his advertising firm he is responsible for smooth-talking clients and wining and dining them to give the diplomatic “human-touch” to the business interaction. Some of his one-liners are pretty sharp, but more importantly he has also experimented with LSD many times. As we learn from previous episodes in the season, he has been shacking up with a hippy girl and sharing the bed with random drop-outs of the sixties era. So when he sees the commune his daughter has been staying at, he takes the opportunity to get a taste of the country-hippy culture to go along with his greater goal of bringing back Margaret.

In the car ride, the family-based morality of where Margaret came from is layer bare:

“It was my fault.” Mona says, “She only had one job and that was to find a husband and she mucked it up.”

The two seem only capable of diagnosing her problems as a wife or a mother or a daughter. The family nucleus is the bedrock of happiness, and any deviations from that path to familial bliss can be corrected by family intervention.

Mona goes on: “She has been a little bit strange lately…” “And a little bit philosophical?” Roger interjects. “Yes…” she replies, “I thought she was finally happy.” End scene.

The blindness of the two to is exacerbated by the fact that they divorced when Margaret was young. They come charging out of the city to pull their daughter back to the family, having already displayed the harshness of their own separation . The family is their conceptual limit of the good life, despite their own failures. A bad conscience is shared by everyone in this episode, a perfect tool for keeping all personal and social problems within the realm of the family.

When they arrive, they find Margaret has changed her name to Marigold and she is steadfast about staying. She stares at them with big bold eyes in layered ponchos and moccasins, dishing back the guilt they try and heap on her. Mona demands be responsible and devote her life to her son, when Marigold reminds Mona of her own depression and heavy drinking problems. Roger mostly stands by and offers money – another sign of his absence as a father and devotion to his work.

“I’m tired of accepting societies definition of me,” says Marigold. “I don’t pray to that anymore.”

Her rejection of the family comes with strings attached: the morality of individualized guilt and innocence is kept in breaching the family structure. When the two parents try and convince her to come back, the moral arguments they use are spun right back in their face. It becomes a stand-off over “who is the worse family member?” instead of a competition of living styles. Mona gets fed up and leaves, convinced her daughter is lost, while Roger stays to try and meet her half-way.

It is the short, yet impactful lines on the porch of the commune that lay bare the motivations for leaving behind the family life. They peel potatoes in an old white farm-house with a few other escapees, passing around a joint.

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The man who first met Roger and Mona and tried to direct them away says, “There is no hierarchy here man.”

Roger fires back, “Believe me, there is always a hierarchy.”

Another proclaims, “we do things by true consensus here. If we can’t all agree, we come up with something else.” Marigold adds on: “Everyone does what they want.”

“I haven’t felt this at one with nature since I was in the Navy.” Replies Roger.

Roger is critical of the commune’s logic, but he hangs with it throughout the night. He and Marigold rest in sleeping-bags outside, staring up at the stars and chatting. Eventually, she says, “I’m really glad you’re a daddy.” (not “I’m glad you’re *my* daddy”). Margaret is Roger’s only child, so she subtly cuts off her position in the family line but simultaneously affirms his. She’s looking for a way out of family-centered life, but only seems to be able to judge Roger based on his position as a father. He either fails in his duty as a father or is praised as a father, a kind of judgment that Marigold is seeking a way out of, yet having a hard time voicing it.

In the middle of the night, Roger is awoken by Marigold running off into the house with a man. In the morning, the same guy who first greeted Roger and Mona at the entrance to the commune walks out of the house right before Marigold. This is also the same guy who had short words with Roger about hierarchy on the porch. It isn’t much of a leap to say that Roger’s presence on the compound was a threat and the hippy-guy made a play to steal away Marigold from she and Roger’s night under the stars. This is perhaps an instance where “everybody does what they want” becomes troubled: desires and power-plays will forever disrupt a simplistic idea of full-consensus.

When Roger wakes up he is through playing games. He forcefully grabs Marigold and leads her away from the house to leave. He picks her up and carries her kicking and yelling, like a patriarch asserting his dominion over his daughter. “I don’t care what you want”, he says before making his move. In the struggle he slips and they both fall in the mud. He makes one last plea: “How could you just leave him? He’s your baby.”

Marigold responds by essential saying “you where a bad father, it’s your fault as well.” She speaks about the times he was never there, working or screwing around himself without paying any attention to her. “Your conscience must have been eating you alive.” she says. The two only seem to be able to hurl blame at each other. Whose fault was it for ruining the family? is the only question they can seem to ask each other.

Earlier in the season, Margaret has an awkward lunch with Roger in which she forgives him ambiguously. He’s confused as to why, but it is clear: Margaret is seeking the moral high ground and forgiving him prematurely for his sins. The communication between the two is in shambles. They are both experimenting with the radical attitudes of the sixties by taking drugs, having multiple partners, and living communally but are unable to relate to each other’s experiences because of the father-daughter relationship. Both are kind of ‘bon vivants’ but cannot find a way to share those life-altering moments together because of the moral imperative imposed on the family structure. He’s the father and has obligations as head of the household (mostly by providing security in wealth) and is reproached for not fathering enough. Marigold is chastised for abandoning her family role as mother. Her flight to the commune comes off as a moralistic rebellion against her father in Mad Men, framed in terms of who is in the wrong? who is to blame?

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The family structure is exactly what communes help subvert and attempt to find a genuine alternative to oppressive patriarchic life and its morality. When the two parents go out to the rustic commune full of hippies to pull their daughter back into that life, they run up against logic constraints that prevent them from adequately expressing themselves to each other. They throw around guilt to justify their actions or else the father resorts to forceful aggression. Even in his attempt to understand the culture and have an experimental moment his Marigold, the father-figure haunts Roger, coming from Marigold’s own voice and the (soon-to-be) dominant hippy-guy’s subtle challenge.

Breaking down those moral-familial relationships is difficult in a society like our own, but Mad Men is unclear in its message as to whether this can or should be done. They often laud the responsible father for reassuming their role in the family as teacher and provider when they have previously been indulging. The father figure haunts the country commune house in this episode, but must it? Living in such a way can seriously and effectively change the patriarchic structure, but all we get is the same moral assertions about who’s family role is performed well and who has a bad conscience. This episode could stand as a warning that escaping patriarchy is more difficult than idealistic youths from the late sixties in America thought, but it could also be a way to load down Roger with blame for not being a good father.

Where the show’s writer and director stand about hierarchy, the family, and communes I still cannot tell. Is Roger asserting the universality of hierarchy merely coming from his embedded and privileged role as successful business man and father? Or is the commune’s free-love idealism and unwillingness to use “technology” misguided simply misguided? Of course, assigning blame to one or the other – the father/businessman or the idealistic hippies – would be to fall for the same moral logic that keeps tripping up Roger and Marigold. I would pinpoint the failure of Roger and Marigold’s relationship there on the moral-ground, but it is unclear as to whether that is the intended message. Seeing as they are both experimenting in the burgeoning counter-culture but cannot communicate except in those terms (“pray”, “conscience”, “forgiveness”), the break-down of their relationship is due to the vain attempt at achieving moral purity or pure happiness instead of just spending time together.

The moral-familial system is the real culprit for preventing Roger and Marigold from sharing their fun-loving experiments in liberation together. This episode was especially powerful in showing this because the commune tried to create an alternative to it, but, like so many communes of the era, failed in confronting the specter of moral purism – one used chiefly for the desire to control populations – but also one that Roger’s business in advertising is helping to perpetuate in the image of the happy, consumer family.

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The Forces of Nietzsche vs. the Humanity of Graeber: part II

The second essay of On the Genealogy of Morals begins tellingly as we immediately get a reflection on the act of promising, memory and forgetfulness. Before the topic of guilt, morality, the bite of conscience, and even the blunt trauma of punishment, Nietzsche writes:

“[t]o breed an animal with the right to make promises – is not this the paradoxical task that nature has set itself in the case of man? is it not the real problem regarding man? … Forgetting is no mere vis inertiae as the superficial imagine; it is rather an active and in the strictest sense positive faculty of repression… a little quietness, a little tabula rasa of the consciousness, to make room for new things, above all for the nobler functions and functionaries, for regulation foresight, premeditation… that is the purpose of active forgetfulness, which is like a doorkeeper, a preserver of psychic order, repose, and etiquette: so that it will be immediately obvious how there could be no happiness, no cheerfulness, no hope, no pride, no present without forgetfulness… Man himself must first of all have become calculable, regular, necessary, even in his own image of himself, if he is to be able to stand security for his own future, which is what one who promises does!” (GM,1).

The ownership of one’s future and the ingrained memory of oneself throughout the course of dynamic time are here the conditions of possibility for the contractual relationships in legal and business matters. The problem pinned down right at the outset of the essay is that of memory and forgetting – how could we have attained such complexity in economics and exchanging goods (as well as continually run into “the individualist” problem in theorizing) without first remaining stable inside of one’s person, one’s name? The problem of humanity in distinction with the rest of the earth animals is how we could come to be seen as the same over time, as individuals, when clearly we undergo changes, learn new tricks, and generally grow and decay in the course of our tumultuous lives. To fashion a memory and a running narrative along with it, closely connected to the body but not necessarily so, is the opening problem that leads us to guilt, bad conscience, and resentment but also the act of promising that brings us into the world of equivocal relationships and indebtedness. In forgetting, Nietzsche allows a moment of tranquility and respite amidst the maze of confusion surrounding business calculations, and the morality of debt. The act of forgetting, active forgetting, is a glimpse into the strong forces emerging from the bounds of the text, joyfully casting off the burden of duty towards one’s past.

What follows is gruesome. From here on, after section one, the second essay of The Genealogy of Morals will take the reader through a long narrative about the emergence of God and feeling of guilt (bad conscience) He brings along with him: a narrative that is mostly a parody of histories of morality that abounded in Nietzsche’s day and which he fought vigorously against. He plays along with the idea for twenty-or-so sections, interjecting every so often to remind us that violence, force, and subjugation are at the root of the order of things. As written above, when tracing a history and giving an account of how we arrived at the present composition of things there is an overwhelming tendency to project the order of the day backwards and export the common, victorious terms of one’s predominant discourse into the past. The contractual relationship viewed from both Nietzsche’s society and ours could not have had an origin in moral sentiments – this notion of reciprocity, the equivalence between two individuals itself is a moral notion and does not persist throughout all times. This would lead us to posit a universal standard across all cultures and societies without much evidence for the inner workings of these people’s or their environments, a standard essentially and undeniably conjoined with immoral and destructive institutions of harm (here the bourgeois, European imperial history and its systemic plundering). The demand to “right” a situation by bringing to a common level the relationship between disputing individuals is no pre-given; it takes a highly active and critical perspective shared by both Nietzsche and Graeber to wade through the axioms and assumptions lingering in the air of one’s culture to provide a counter-narrative.

There is a constant equivocation of origins with violence. Throughout the second essay, legal terminology is dotted with coarse words evoking brutal pain and torture: “it was in this sphere then, the sphere of legal obligations, that the moral conceptual world of “guilt,” “conscience,” “duty,” “sacredness of duty” had its origin: its beginnings were, like the beginnings of everything great on earth, soaked in blood thoroughly and for a long time” (GM,6). The moral feelings that bind us to harmony have a perverse underside: the pain and trauma inscribed into the memory of the body directly. The origins of moral concepts have are in this passage legal issues and obligations, but just a few pages later he switches to the creditor/debtor business relationship:

“…the feeling of guilt, of personal obligation, had its origin, as we saw, in the oldest and most primitive personal relationship, that between buyer and seller, creditor and debtor: it was here that one person first encountered another person, that one person first measured himself against another.” (GM,8)

Bear in mind Nietzsche’s ambivalence concerning origins. This is the parody side of the essay, the one which Graeber correctly identifies as playing along with a bourgeois audience only to shock them with the necessary horrors that they would not have acknowledge in their elegant theories, sitting in the quiet rooms of study where they wrote their treatise. Seeking the origin of a phenomenon like morality or debt is only to mislead and confuse the reader, even when done rigorously and scientifically. To do so anyways would neglect an incomprehensible amount of forces vying for their subsistence and growth; the only way to avoid this is to play along with the attempts of others and use their reasoning against them in an ironic distance. The emphasis on violence, destruction, and assault is a ploy to link together those cool, calm, and collected observations into the essence of things with that which they forget: the forces we must tarry and battle with constantly. This excessive memory of secure individuals writing books, the memory that recollects so much of the fine details or holds an idea firmly and dearly throughout the wide length of their lives, is unable to perform the act of forgetting – an active forgetting. Origins reappear constantly in all ages (as we already posited with Nietzsche in part 1) and stick into the memory of its actors. Just consider the endless repetition of nationalist beginnings and their moments of triumph, their grand significance that lives on in the cultural memory. What bloody battles and rampant slaughter they leave out! Nearly every “great” historical moment has an obscene underside with violent undertones that we parse out for the sake of a comfortable narrative. The teaching of this narrative coupled with the mandatory schooling for a nation’s youth means a institutional replication of a memory of origins. The “grim realities of war” line that accompany these histories spotted with dates of wars gloss over the suffering and deep misery they bring to the people caught up in them.

Both Graeber and Nietzsche understand this, but morality is tricky; Graeber employs this unveiling technique in his great-grand historico-anthropological treatise of his own with disdain. The essential goodness of communities is always contrasted with the violence of the state and the violence of cold financial transaction. Nietzsche keeps a extremely acute eye on the subtleties of morality and develops a style that is critical of its inner-workings, all the while maintaining a creativity that is essentially positive and non-judgmental. Tellingly, the next chapter in *Debt after dealing with On the Genealogy of Morals is “A Brief Treatise on the Moral Grounds of Economic Relations”, where a new theory of human relationships (the real question of foundations) and their grounding in humanity is asserted “from scratch”. In the next essay of On the Genealogy of Morals, the religious ascetic life is closely examined and the ascetic emerges not in shambles but transformed into a boiler-room of creativity in a hope for the “man of the future” that will overcome it. To merely denounce violence and take a moral stance against those things that Nietzsche makes abundantly clear that he despises would be to get caught up in the logic of that which plagues him so. Challenging Christianty by moralizing would not escape the moral logic he wishes to get rid of; to escape we cannot simply negate but must launch out from that which we are forced to endure. The vital energies that these abhorrent systems and logics have imbued in us are the places from which to transform ourselves and create something anew.

But the tension between these two writers can be heightened even further: Nietzsche takes shots at the anarchism that Graeber ascribes to for shrinking away from the power implicit in the will, the ever-expanding will that dominates and without remorse. Having come from the common place of brutality behind origins, the divergence is sharp:

“…the cause of the origin of a thing and its eventual utility, its actual employment and place in a system of purposes, lie worlds apart; whatever exists, having somehow come into being, is again and again reinterpreted to new ends, taken over, transformed, and redirected by some power superior to it; all events in the organic world are a subduing, a becoming master, and all subduing and becoming master involves a fresh interpretation, an adaptation through which any previous “meaning” and “purpose” are necessarily obscured or even obliterated.” (GM,12)

Breaching origins and causes does not bring us back to a baseline communism here; the disruption of origins and the deconstruction of treatise on the nature of economics, morality, and the like are themselves manifestations of a new interpretation taking shape, a new force burgeoning outward. Beneath or behind these origins and statements here lies a contested ground. On the one hand, there is the common decency of people together sharing; what is untouched by laws, contracts, and money; or Graeber’s communal humanity “refusing to make such calculations, refusing to measure or remember who had given what to whom” (Debt,79). On the other hand, there are bare forces mixing and jockeying in a basically non-human contest for power. Ever the astute historian, Graeber will point to the dominant quality of societies to explain why hierarchies and embattled parties engage in struggle for power: heroic societies of honor and commercial societies with their markets have “slipped” into their respective class relations. The social arrangements are depicted as the cause for leading astray the basic, common, human element. These societies could only ever appear as aberrations – a mistake in the development from “the foundation of our humanity”.

What a great number of mistakes there have been throughout the coarse of humanity! A comprehensive collection of examples of the ways humanity has been corrupted by deviant social organizations would be staggering (a discussion on anti-civilization primitivism will have wait for now) and Graeber’s book does come off in many instances as a very long series of travesties staining a core humanity. One might wonder if man is more commonly conniving in its history and whether we should take Nietzsche’s opposite parody version of man as the “calculating animal” as more sound. Man for Nietzsche is something that must be overcome rather than retrieve from the immoral structures that have laid their “terrible claws” upon it; it is in this sense that what comes after man and the state must be more intense, more affirmative than what history has provided hitherto. But what of man’s pre-history? there pretender origins appears again! Historians surely select there topics according to their wishes and their social training (and so the values of a particular society are drawn out of them), as Nietzsche would agree. But could this not be explained as a force willing itself into the past to triumphantly assert its existence as either the culmination of the story or as its own hidden, untold greatness? How are we to think of pre-historical humans or even the neighboring species of chimpanzees from which we evolved but from the present moment in which we now conduct our research? The thought of “origins of the human” must dominate any look into pre-history considered by anthropology but not, for instance, biology or ecology – for ’human’ is right there in the name (anthro-) and therefore presupposes its common attributes. It becomes hard not to imagine the forces pushing back on these (perhaps non-human or not-yet-human) communities fearing for their survival and the solidarity born out of the difficulties of tribal-level reproduction.

The will expressed in Graeber is clearly a critical spirit actively preventing logics of domination imposing themselves all around it. Actively engaged in political organizing himself, his grand work has anchored many seeking another world (forcefully). A work like this is an extremely potent force, but one that can sink into moralisms that reintroduce an ideal into an otherwise brilliant work of historical anthropology. Take this passage for example:

“Sometimes people’s “abilities” and “needs” are grossly disproportionate. Genuine egalitarian societies are keenly aware of this and tend to develop elaborate safe-guards around the dangers of anyone – say, especially good hunters, in a hunting society – rising too far above themselves…
Communes or egalitarian collectives in the United States often face similar dilemmas, and they have come up with their own safeguards against creeping hierarchy. It’s not that the tendency for communism to slip into hierarchy is inevitable – societies like the Inuit have managed to fend it off for thousands of years – but rather, that one must always guard against it.” (Debt,115-116)

The activity of safeguarding an ideal is something that Graeber seems to be almost explicitly endorsing. Vigilance toward conformity is itself a powerful force: a reactive force that sees the actively dominant force pouring outside itself and quickly cuts it down (to employ Nietzsche-speak). “Keeping things commie” must entail checking the forces of growth that sprout up one at a time; a leveling force is required to counter act the repeated transgression. This seems to have functioned smoothly in a few societies on the earth – a few. The repetition of preserving a social form and actively preventing others from disrupting that form must be thought as just that: an active that is performed over and over again to keep it in place. The only thing that stops us from calling such a conformity oppressive at this point is by alerting people to the “fact” that our very essence as human is being threatened. The force of dogmatism functions in ways beyond that of simply the state, organized religion, the market, racism, and patriarchy. Keeping a lid on deviancy could be described this way, especially when an ideal is attempted to be held in one’s securely hand – trying to escape.

One could argue, on the contrary, that this Nietzschean force-philosophy is merely the product of a deranged man reared in a social environment of austerity and militancy. The question then would be if this reduction of the work to the surrounding society from which it came is not reemploying the idea of origins as a cause, whether the philosophy is over-determined by its time and place. This brings us to one of the big differences in their style: while the social forms determine the type expressions a culture will take in Graeber, a more intensive forces/power play is operating in Nietzsche. One observes the social-historical with more scientific research at his disposal, the other collapses nature and culture into a single plane of cosmic or planetary fluctuations of power. This seems a legitimate decision one must make regarding just how much one’s social structures define the possibilities and limitations of one’s imagination, and how much is dependent upon more physical forces of the earth/cosmos: a decision that cannot be merely spontaneous but must be a matter of degrees.

Moving along with expanding the tension between the two, Nietzsche makes his own attacks on the spirit of reactive safeguarding impulse very obvious:

“The democratic idiosyncrasy which opposes everything that dominates and wants to dominate, the modern misarchism (to coin an ugly word for an ugly thing) has permeated the realm of the spirit and disguised itself in the most spiritual forms to such a degree that today it has forced its way, has acquired the right to force its way into the strictest, apparently most objective sciences; indeed, it seems to me to have already taken charge of all physiology and theory of life – to the detriment of life, as goes without saying, since it has robbed it of a fundamental concept, that of activity.” (GM,12)

That hatred of rule in “misarchism”, its gaining entrance to science by acquiring the “right” is something despicable for the way in which it subverts the will to power – life’s penchant for activity. The “essence of life” for Nietzsche is primarily about (he will say later in the same paragraph) the “spontaneous, aggressive, expansive, form-giving forces that give new interpretations and directions” (GM,12) during its brighter moments. But does the essence of anarchism necessarily run opposite of this active force? Do they not, and Graeber among them, work tirelessly at creating action-events by willing themselves ever forward against monumental odds and fighting oppression with a counter-force of their own – wherever it rears its ugly head? The impossible demands and slogans of direct action participants like “another world is possible” seem to perfectly suit Nietzsche’s criteria of making new interpretations and expanding the vitality of the scope of the imagination. This is undeniably so in the moments of contention with the state and its “terrible claws”, but also in the networking or solidarity building activity that “grows the movement”. What Nietzsche is railing against is not this em-powering work but the use of back-door strategies of obtaining rights and hearings from the big-bad state. When the tide is diminished and activity wanes, the reactive forces that get sucked into the comfortable subordination of the state or the marketplace machine are the type that are so deplorable. Appealing to dominant power’s inner-moral-feelings and accruing concessions is exactly the result of an approach that focuses on “rights” and the contractual relationship. The two writers considered here understand this very well: human rights and reciprocal fairness remain within a logic of ethical conduct that presupposes the religious institutions set up inside of the state/market form. This is the direct action strategy that Graeber endorses and practices: setting up alternative structures to the state/market model and then ignoring the state, standing guard against capital circulating through it (Capitalist-free zones). The difference is that Nietzsche resists the humanism that fits within that state-market-morality form as well, with Graeber retaining a primal humanity he believes exist apart from it. I add the primal to his more explicit humanism, considering the anthropological nature of his investigation into the common threads found in humanity as a whole and the basic congenial relatability he posits in it.

Looking back to Graeber’s Debt with this covert morality of primal humanism in mind, we’ll next come to some of the insightful findings of the ethnographic study and infuse Nietzsche’s emphasis on active forgetting and forces so as to refine Graeber’s anarchism.

The idea of a common communal humanity in baseline communism coursing throughout Debt is an alternative moral foundation to the ’rights’ discourse, which it ruthlessly uproots – particularly in in the chapter “Honor and Degradation: or, on the foundation of contemporary civilization”. Here we get definitions of slavery (“the ultimate form of being ripped from one’s contexts, and thus from all the social relationships that make one a human being.”), and honor (“surplus dignity” p.168). These definitions are contestable. But the real clincher in this chapter that is worth spending the most time on is the discussion of how ancient civilizations and their discourses on legal and religious norms have persisted, coloring our own talk in the vast majority of the public realm. From the heroic societies like Greece and Rome that passed down their terminology and social structures underpinning them, we have received dilemmas that last to this day: property rights and, more generally, the idea of possessing rights at all. The ethical conundrums that rise from this (and these issues, it should be noted, arise in market and war based states) have defined entire subsequent traditions that make up both the convoluted system of laws that are supposed to mete out justice and the roots of patriarchy.

Here again the assertion of the nature of a society – it’s covering-over of communism with some selection of debt logics, equalization, hierarchies, and violence – produces a more-or-less well categorized type of people and set of issues with which the society must struggle to find solutions to. The social forms that overtake the community indicate the moral problems that take shape. Cultures of war and commerce tend to become confused and concerned by the rising indebtedness of large amounts of its population and the powerful individuals inside of it tend to feel threatened by money, taking drastic measures to make it publicly known that there honor is beyond the equivalences brought on by the universal value of money. Graeber argues convincingly (with plenty of footnotes and scientific backing) that the phenomenon of money and debt, together with the organized violence of the state and its warriors, prefigures the emergence of a tradition of ethics/morality found in the academies, the laws, and the religions – traditions whose base of words and ideas have persisted into our present day and have extended around much of the globe from the Mediterranean civilizations (namely, Rome).

In short, as trade began expanding in Greece, money became central to the daily life of the citizens of the cities. Aristocrats and warriors wanted to ensure that their estates were not subject to the equalizing power of money. So as “money introduced a democratization of desire” and everybody needed it for the basic necessities of life (p.190), one’s honor became a measure of how far one could keep themselves from the vile dictates of the marketplace. With the widespread appearance of coinage in a marketplace that seemed to envelope the entire society, making-do without recourse to commerce and trade became a status symbol. Rather than flaunting one’s wealth, the honor of the warrior was measured by how far he could distance himself from wealth in the eyes of his fellow citizens: “money, then, had passed from a measure of honor to a measure of everything that money was not. To suggest that a man’s honor could be bought with money would be a terrible insult -” (p.188). Eliminating risk and making a secure financial future for oneself ran counter to these warriors’ ideals. The extravagance of the wealthy is in stark opposition to “martial honor”: “A warrior’s honor is his willingness to play a game in which he stakes everything. His grandeur is directly proportional to how far he can fall.” (p.189). It was the mass market that sprang up in the Mediterranean cities along the coasts that made the circulation of money more fluid, spreading the equalizing transactions of minted coins for goods that occupied the previous system of credit and debt. The heroic warrior mentality had to morph into the struggle to remain above this ubiquity and to retain the cherished greatness that comes from the risk and victory of battle. This became keeping a tight hold on their house, lording over their property: “This extreme fear of dependency on others’ whims lies at the basis of the Greek obsession with the self-sufficient household.” (p.190). One could say that the warrior’s penchant for conquest and glory (codified by the honor and renown placed on him by his neighbors) was domesticated (quite literally) by money and markets, or even captured by the colonial machine.

Transitioning from Greece to Rome, property becomes the central theme of the complex laws that were drawn up in order to settle disputes in Ancient Rome. These basic concepts of property ownership have since been translated into the more idealistic notions of freedom, liberty, and rights as being “possessed” or “owned” by individuals from a legal-contractual point of view. The Roman Empire it seems most effectively conquered the world through its laws, for “Roman law has come to provide the language and conceptual underpinnings of legal and constitutional orders everywhere.” The hang-up of Roman law, its dilemma that caused difficulty in formulating particular laws was that “[i]n Roman law, property, or dominium, is a relation between a person and a thing, characterized by absolute power over that thing. This definition has caused endless conceptual problems.” Considering, as Graeber does, that property laws are not about people in relation to things but “an understanding or arrangement between people concerning things” (p.198), one can see how slavery fits in so easily in Rome: when the law is based on ownership of things in a society with much commerce and conquest, supposedly equal relationships with people can fall very quickly into master and slave.

“In creating a notion of dominium, then, and this creating the modern principle of absolute private property, what Roman jurists were doing first of all was taking a principle of domestic authority, of absolute power over people, defining some of those people (slaves) as things, and then extending the logic that originally applied to slaves to geese, chariots, barns, jewelry boxes, and so forth – that is, to every other sort of thing the law had to do with.” (p.201)

As the structures of the state and the markets that developed between and inside them became more stable in the empire that was Rome, the laws also became more important in clearly defining when and where someone could fall into slavery and what control the city had over the people. The house-hold became the place where the male citizen could exercise his dominance over everything within it. Graeber notes how ’dominate’ and ’domestic’ have the same root in the Latin ’domus’. It was in Imperial Rome then that property was inscribed in the laws as a *right that one *has, so as to provide the space where the citizen could still lord-over in a world dominated itself by the twin pincers of commercial exchange (coinage, profits, debts, etc.) and outright war.

This is the hidden underside of the noble and ideal notions that circulate (as if they had the currency of a coin) in the discourse of so many communities, cities, and nations to this day: owning one’s freedom, saying “I have rights” is a derivative of Roman property law that codified the transition from master to slave within the empire. To have rights or own liberties also means that one can sell them. We are free to give up our freedom so to speak; given the predominance of markets and the need to make money to stay afloat in necessities of life, this was bound to happen. When freedom takes on the characteristic of property and rights are owned, we presuppose the individual person – as isolated and naturally independent – and sort of commodify it, as if we could take this thing that we own (our freedom) and sell it, or buy someone else’s.

“At this point we can finally see what’s really at stake in our peculiar habit of defining ourselves simultaneously as master and slave, reduplicating the most brutal aspects of the ancient household in our very concept of ourselves, as masters of our freedoms, or as owners of our very selves. It is the only way that we can imagine ourselves as completely isolated beings. There is a direct line from the new Roman conception of liberty… to the strange fantasies of liberal philosophers like Hobbes, Locke, and Smith, about the origins of human society…” (p.210)

These concepts have worked their way into our collective consciousness by way of translated texts that could travel along the Roman-built roads and the continuity of the Christain Church afterwards. The ownership of rights and liberties as property of individuals extends from Rome to western Europe to the American colonies to the rhetoric of protesters seeking redress for the pain and torment inflicted by this model of imperial warfare. With increasingly efficient war machinery and the capture of territories by the creation of markets and indebted nations, the lexicon of those who resist is for the most part still colored by the Roman heritage of the colonizers. Demands and ideals for redress of grievances or assertions of autonomy take the form of already having the right to self-determination (at best) or seeking to gain rights and the respect from the greater countries (worse). Graeber will labor on and on about the violence behind this, as if the whole edifice was held together by the brute threat of beating people up or killing them at the bottom of it, or else the violence done by demanding equivalent repayment for one’s monied debts (perhaps with interest). He seems to want to constantly remind us of this in order to draw on our moral affectations, which he has provided a ground for in baseline communism. Appealing to these sentiments is a strategy that invokes a desire to be rid of the entire structure of civilization, states, and money so as to allow for the primitive-communistic allocation of needs to all in our closest proximity (tribe maybe). So, unearthing the origins of our tarnished present turns out to be an exercise in replacing them with new origins: those of humanity.

But what happened to the honor of the Greek warrior obsessed with remaining outside the money system? If we are not to overdetermine the behavior of these warriors by pointing to their society of origin, then we can say that they were a form (albeit a privileged form) of resistance to the logic of money and markets. The reverence for honor that develops in response to the rise of markets and the moral conundrums they produce could be described as a safeguarding of one’s greater force from the flattening out a population of people. The public displays of one’s non-monetary worth in extravagant gift-giving is here reactive to the burgeoning influence of money in their cities and towns; but as to the origins of the warrior ideal itself, we do not receive from Graeber any explanations besides “violence” – which is clearly meant to have shock value and offend the reader’s sensibilities. The state and the forced imposition of symmetry in repayment assume the entirety of the blame for the violence of war and the desire of the honor-bound.

We need not resort to a social-determinism to explain why cultures become violent. On the other hand, we cannot assert that people are violent “by nature”. This simple dichotomy of contingent social forms/natural certainty (nature/nurture or “social construction”/essence) is precisely the quagmire that Nietzsche helps us get over in casting off and poking-fun at the narrative of origins. An origin-story must be retold over and over again to the young student, molding the subject and its soft, sculptable body for it to survive the flow of time. An origin can only ever live on in the memory of a body-politic and the narrative it communicates to itself; to be *forced into remembering the violence of the origin, its obscene counterpart to the glossy coating, does not get us beyond the logic of states, debt, or ’human rights.’ Understanding the forces bearing down on these bodies-politic does. For instance, the harsh mountainous geology of Greece made cities more isolated from each other, its close geographic proximity to the Persian Empire, sticking out into a sea with a history of once established civilizations and favorable wind patterns, and, yes, the rise of coinage and markets all contributed as *forces to a heroic society of war (See John Protevi, ’Geophilosophy: War and Earth’ in *Life War Earth: Deleuze and the Sciences). But to take the origin-search this far would be to analyze so much detail as to take us out of the strictly social realm and into the earth-physical forces that always intermingle with the unique social structures of any given group of people. Nietzsche’s force-philosophy can’t take us their, for the advancement of the sciences had not allowed him to. But dissolving the attachment to origins rhetorically and reminding us to forget them so as to deal with what is in front of us in the near future is something at which Nietzsche was masterful. His diagnoses were restricted to the metaphors and scientific advancement of his time, but he could look past the symbols containing social currency and find other forces at work.

The alternative history of an idea we get from Graeber with the beginnings of human rights discourse in Roman property laws (and the domesticated warrior shrunk into his house, while the Empire expands) serves to reevaluate the entire progressivist terminology. The ideals that get in the way of a true communistic autonomy turn out to be the ones that get used by people supposedly on its side. Demanding rights isn’t a radical alternative to the existing order of things, but merely a demand for access to it: a seat at the table in global dominance. “Most of our most precious rights and freedoms are a series of exceptions to an overall moral and legal framework that suggests we shouldn’t really have them in the first place.” (p.210). But it takes little more than a cover-to-cover reading of Debt to see that the alternative moral framework proposed is a primitive humanism, where periodic debt cancellation was normal in order to stave off deserting citizens and rebellious mobs. This does differ qualitatively from pretty much all of the dead-end strategies and rhetoric of contemporary (pseudo-)resistances to Capitalism, but it merely reverses the progressive faith in the future socialist state that tames Capitalism by growing bigger than it with a harkening back to a time of innocence. Rather than everyone gaining rights and owning a well-defined property/territory that separates them from an exploitative market or state military-force (aka the police), a community “before violence” asserts itself underneath the layers of intrusive social organization. The reversal is similar to Nietzsche’s “reevaluation of all values” but stops short at his search for “the overman” that would go beyond man. Essentially, if we strip down to the base(line) community, we would get to live out the goodness of each other’s company without any aggressiveness (just keep the exceptionally skilled one’s from gaining any distance!).

The progressivist humanism of rights accumulation differs from the primordial humanism of communization, but still remains a humanism. Lacking a nuanced understanding of the potential forces awaiting actualization, strategic maneuvering against something as powerful as the state or the market thought as totalized wholes relies on their negative moralization. We do not get beyond this moral framework (humanism) by singling out the violence of the state and the logic of debt and sticking all of the blame on them. This merely perpetuates the weak position of the pure, human resistor knocking at the great big castle doors of the corrupt state. A counter-power that frees itself from the grip of the state might not have to become conscious of itself as a force until the moment it faces real forceful opposition, but repeating the morality of the oppressors indefinitely will keep the counter-power to a limited scale. Movements must be able to grow and foster the expanding, aggressive impulse that marks a vital body.

While Graeber gives us the opposing ethic of the primal anarchist against the progressivist ethic of a more equitable, inclusive future, Nietzsche simply wouldn’t have made this distinction – he observed in the texts of revolutionaries manifested during his life a hatred of rule and a despising of what he thought to be most essential to the forces of life. Mutual aid, solidarity, and communal living can be incorporated into the Nietzschean affirmation of creative forces unkept by weakness and resentment, but today – I would contend – only as a movement or campaign. People are constantly asking each other about the next move, the next event during the course of struggle. How to keep moving on and whether the group is growing or dying, strengthening or weakening, or waxing or waning (if the previous two are too dramatic) is always being assessed by participants of a campaign or an emerging body with a political agenda.

Graeber perhaps too easily selects his own version of anarchism without picking out precisely what in anarchism remains philosophical-moralistically progressive. On the flip side, his access to vast historical records allows him to build a convincing argument about social-historical change from the (moral) ground up. Science itself, however, has a clearly visible progressivist streak that someone as sensitive to triumphalist narratives like he would do well to look into, that is, regarding an historical telos. The early revolutionary theorists of Europe were heavily influenced by Hegel and the progressive model historical change. A flow of history recorded in the archives and redeployed in massive (usually nationalistic) volumes made for a sentiment that the movement of time was getting better and better, eventually to reach an ideal state, or absence thereof. It is precisely this mixture of metaphysics (in the classic sense of causation and beginning/ends in nature; not physics) and history that Nietzsche could only bear with rage:

“The evolution of a thing, a custom, an organ is this by no means its progressus toward a goal, even less a logical progressus by the shortest route and with the smallest expenditure of force – but a succession of more or less profound, more or less mutually independent processes of subduing, plus the resistances they encounter, the attempts at transformation for the purpose of defense and reaction, and the results of successful counteractions. The form is fluid, but the “meaning” is even more so.” (GM,12)

But Graeber does not take the progressivist stance of his predecessors. He believes his work to be proceeding along lines beyond that of classical anarchism, but doesn’t want to ascribe to anything but anarchism. Anarchism is only but a practice and kind of verb to him and he rejects to serious an affiliation with the classical figureheads of Proudhon, Bakunin, and Kropotkin. Recent work has been done by people like Todd May, Duanne Rousselle, and Saul Newman among others in mixing Nietzschean, post-Nietzschean, or postructuralist philosophy with anarchism in a body of literature provisionally titled “post-anarchism”. Graeber himself has written about the “new anarchists” and I think would benefit from engaging with post-anarchism. But anarchists often have a hard time getting over the French-wave of intellectual celebrity in the later part of the twentieth century and reading some damn Foucault. In fact, much of the general thrust of my argument can gleaned from his essay Nietzsche Genealogy History.

The reason for bringing all of this progressivism up is to remind us of some of the pretenses from which a great deal of the revolutionary action comes from and from which the massive work of anthropology in Debt doesn’t so much remain in line with as reverse. Debt does this by grounding itself and advocating a return to debt jubilee, but such an action of canceling all the debts could only be accomplished by a sovereign whose moral authority is robbed by a baseline communism. Is Graeber using a primitivism morality to try and convince a state authority to relieve the peasants, so that we could do it all all over again? Or is he demonstrating the necessity of a debt cancellation prophetically? I doubt it would be either of these; he is pointing the way towards resistance and I am trying to give it more oomph.

The force that would bring about something new must also forget the past of origins and be strong enough to do so, and perhaps must also be strong enough to create new origins.

Let’s return to Nietzsche. At the culmination of Nietzsche’s parody-narrative of debt and legal contracts as the origin of morals and guilt, we get the most odd twist of logic produced from carrying out a bad thought to its consequences. If debts are at the heart of ethics and business transactions are the first instance of men’s measurement against each other, the valuations found in Christianity and other similarly monotheistic religious doctrines must be too. As tribes advance to greater strength, each time more deeply indebted to their ancestors, to the gods, then finally to the ultimate God of pure credit for bestowing the whole universe (with a more personal touch), the debt becomes the heaviest burden imaginable – an all knowing, all seeing, all powerful whole to complement the hole in one’s soul. An individual’s relationship with such a being could only raise the stakes to epic proportions.

“…suddenly we stand before the paradoxical and horrifying expedient that afforded temporary relief for tormented humanity, that stroke of genius on the part of Christianity: God himself makes payment to himself for the guilt of mankind, God sacrifices himself for the guilt of mankind, God himself makes payment to himself, God as the only being who can redeem man form what has become up redeemable for man himself – the creditor sacrifices himself for his debtor, out of love (can one credit that?) out of love for his debtor!” (GM,21)

It is a truly ridiculous story in which God does all the accounting work for a weak and sinful lot of people. The great God-Creditor sacrifices his son to pay off a debt not to anyone else but to himself. As Graeber repeatedly notes, people actually would sell off their children onto slavery or otherwise to pay off debts, but this is no debtor paying back a loan, it is God paying back himself for someone else’s debts: the ineradicable sin of mortals. One cannot rid oneself of original sin, yet God sent his son to die for us anyways and rid Him (the great Creditor) of His (nonexistent) debts. Hence the precisely effective meme that spreads like a virus amongst people with anything resembling a market: “Jesus died for your sins.” The great creditor in the sky is said to have sacrificed his own son the way a debtor would, but only to pay himself back. All of us sinners remain in debt in essence but are unable to top God’s sacrifice – we remain infinitely in debt.

A good reader will focus on the immediately preceding section 22 and see that this is a fable and not the full picture of debt and morality. This talk of debt and credit has reached its limit and we must come down from heaven to meet the pangs of forces:

“You will have guessed what has really happened here, beneath all this: that the will to self-tormenting, that repressed cruelty of the animal-man made inward and scared back into himself, the creature imprisoned in the “state” so as to be tamed, who invented the bad conscience in order to hurt the more natural vent for this desire to hurt had been blocked – this man of the bad conscience has seized upon the presupposition of religion so as to drive his self-torture to its most gruesome pitch of severity and rigor. Guilt before God: this thought becomes an instrument of torture to him.”

The man of bad conscience that Nietzsche describes is not the debtor but the one kept from its own outward expression and the conquering impulse by training, punishment, fear, and the state. These techniques and formations are what prevent the will to life from its fulfillment; this is what is “really” going on here. The religious garb is a spiritual cover to feelings of internalized oppression:

“All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly turn inward – this is what I call the internalization of man: this it was that man first developed what later was called his “soul.”” (GM,16)

Nietzsche’s real is contrasted with Graeber’s real: the forces of internalization that scare and push back against the body vs. the foundations of our humanity in communal affection.

The extent to which a foundational humanism can be swallowed up by the forces of resentment that Nietzsche diagnosed is determined by the way such a humanism is deployed against the reprehensible systems and statues of the state, the pastorate, the corporations, etc. If they only work so as to reinforce the power relationship by taking hold of the moral logic of the master and attempting to use it against power (when it was perfected and deployed as an art of subjugation), then we will only get caught up in the same loops that plague the (human) “rights” discourse. Graeber can see through the contractual rights framework but not the humanism of the pastorate.

—-

So where does this leave us? If something like a jubilee that Graeber suggest at the end of Debt is going to happen, then I think some of the intellectual work done by Nietzsche and his predecessors would be well taken by other anarchists and Debt Strikers. To put the active back into the name activist, those feelings of joy, empowerment, and expansion should take precedence over moralizing and the pining for the communistic purity of human decency. The strategy of appealing to a moral sense of community does indeed have a role to play, but it can only take one so far. In the ancient civilizations that Graeber would have us look back on and learn from, a great deal of people had to flee their homes en mass and, if that was not enough, form militias to sack the capitals to challenge their indebtedness and their banishment:

“The pastoral fringes, the deserts and steppes away from the river valleys, were the places to which displaced, indebted farmers fled. Resistance, in the ancient Middle East, was always less a politics of rebellion than a politics of exodus, of melting away with one’s flocks and families – often before both were taken away. There were always tribal peoples living on the fringes. During good times, they began to take to the cities; in hard times their numbers swelled with refugees – farmers who effectively became Enkidu once again. Then, periodically, they would create their own alliances and sweep back into the cities once again as conquerors.” (Debt, p.183)

We could always try and implore the sovereign to take pity on our destitution, but when they listen almost exclusively to financiers and the businesses that have ascended into their position as big market players, the chance of that working is going to be small. Politicians tend to make decisions based on the pressures surrounding them, the ones that got them into the position they are in and could remove them very soon. If we revert back to the early forms of civilization, then resisting debt would have to eventually take the form of a counter-force of people who feel as if they had no future – as if the only option available to them was too escape. However, to assemble a new body-politic with enough force and vitality to withstand the pressures from the established forced bearing down on it with its debt-inducing machines would be another option that skips the exodus altogether. The only escape would be right into the middle of the political by doing the most political thing one can do in times of crisis: assembling as a collective body in those places where public assembly could still happen. There we would find the force to back up the demand for debt cancellation.

Which isn’t to say that such a force would be explicitly a collection of debtors or take the fulfillment of a particular demand against debt as goal. People have their critiques against the refusal of repayment, and the reciprocal-contractual morality of the market weighs heavily on the people as subjects. Both Nietzsche and Graeber are in agreement here. The new community of people that springs forth from that assembly in all of its force and vivacity is also something whose relevance and power is hard for anyone to disagree on. But, in attempts to make more than merely a semantic point, that body will need to recognize itself as a force to be reckoned with at some point and not just a rekindling of a humanity long lost on a social atmosphere permeated by the immoral, unjust, or otherwise hated prospect of war and financial solvency.

When people are organized (however loosely) together horizontally in these common places, what is produced is no mere static entity but a vibrant body that cannot help itself from expanding and growing large. The emergent body cannot be separated from its force – the power and ability the body has in influencing surrounding forces. A major and perhaps defining feature of such a body is the potential to act out of its own vitality as well as reproduce itself. The attributes of such a body are always context specific, but the immediacy of a rupture in the fabric of power relations is felt throughout all bodies affected.

Running through Nietzsche’s essay we have found that the memory calling upon the individual to keep tabs on oneself and keep account of its contractual affairs with others is not only a laughable way to speak of morality but pernicious. When taken to its extreme, it displays the weakness of the line of reasoning and the weakness it induces in creating the person of “bad conscience” or resentful one who cannot express their emotions outwardly, keeping them harbored so as to let them fester and render one more or less impotent. The priest of the church and the confession booth work on the subjection of of the individual so as to “force” a retreat back inside of itself. In the realistic-forceful take on morality, the symbols of worship and the ideas of “original sin” are merely the surface of a more docile population of self-regulating bodies. This same morality is taken up by Graeber although in a primal humanist manner in his baseline communism. Such a “baseline” suggests that no debt burden or criminal act could fall below it, for we are all humans at the bottom line.

More important than discovering a steady foundation for humanity, a collective political body must actualize itself as a force to rework the financial and political constraints on us as individuals. Casting off the memories burned into us through institutional training and actively forgetting the past rather than bringing us back to them (here as moral foundations) would be mark of strength.

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